From e92112b014ac3813e580e9016b71957ab59a800d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haritha <73516759+HarithaVattikuti@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 16:49:13 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Fix security vulnerabilities (#767)

* fix: resolve npm audit vulnerabilities, refresh license cache, rebuild dist

- npm audit fix resolves brace-expansion (high), fast-xml-parser (high),
  and undici (moderate) advisories via transitive dependency updates
- Regenerated .licenses/npm cache to match updated dependency tree
- Rebuilt dist/setup and dist/cache-save bundles

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: sync vendored install-dotnet.ps1 with upstream dot.net script

Basic Validation was failing because the vendored copy of
externals/install-dotnet.ps1 was out of date compared to the live
script served from https://dot.net/v1/dotnet-install.ps1, which
installation-scripts.test.ts compares against on every run.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 .licenses/npm/@nodable/entities.dep.yml       |    4 +-
 ...dep.yml => brace-expansion-1.1.18.dep.yml} |    2 +-
 ....dep.yml => brace-expansion-5.0.9.dep.yml} |    2 +-
 .licenses/npm/fast-xml-parser.dep.yml         |    2 +-
 .licenses/npm/is-unsafe.dep.yml               |    4 +-
 .licenses/npm/path-expression-matcher.dep.yml |    2 +-
 .licenses/npm/undici.dep.yml                  |    2 +-
 ...aming.dep.yml => xml-naming-0.1.0.dep.yml} |    2 +-
 .licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.3.0.dep.yml        |   35 +
 dist/cache-save/index.js                      | 1593 ++++++++++----
 dist/setup/index.js                           | 1885 ++++++++++++-----
 externals/install-dotnet.ps1                  |  144 +-
 package-lock.json                             |  103 +-
 13 files changed, 2739 insertions(+), 1041 deletions(-)
 rename .licenses/npm/{brace-expansion-1.1.15.dep.yml => brace-expansion-1.1.18.dep.yml} (99%)
 rename .licenses/npm/{brace-expansion-5.0.6.dep.yml => brace-expansion-5.0.9.dep.yml} (98%)
 rename .licenses/npm/{xml-naming.dep.yml => xml-naming-0.1.0.dep.yml} (95%)
 create mode 100644 .licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.3.0.dep.yml

diff --git a/.licenses/npm/@nodable/entities.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/@nodable/entities.dep.yml
index c11ab9f..b02eaad 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/@nodable/entities.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/@nodable/entities.dep.yml
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 ---
 name: "@nodable/entities"
-version: 2.2.0
+version: 3.0.0
 type: npm
 summary: Entity parser for XML, HTML, External entites with security and NCR control
-homepage: 
+homepage:
 license: mit
 licenses:
 - sources: README.md
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-1.1.15.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-1.1.18.dep.yml
similarity index 99%
rename from .licenses/npm/brace-expansion-1.1.15.dep.yml
rename to .licenses/npm/brace-expansion-1.1.18.dep.yml
index cc67fe7..32de44b 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-1.1.15.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-1.1.18.dep.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: brace-expansion
-version: 1.1.15
+version: 1.1.18
 type: npm
 summary: Brace expansion as known from sh/bash
 homepage: https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-5.0.6.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-5.0.9.dep.yml
similarity index 98%
rename from .licenses/npm/brace-expansion-5.0.6.dep.yml
rename to .licenses/npm/brace-expansion-5.0.9.dep.yml
index af66077..fd7e18f 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-5.0.6.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/brace-expansion-5.0.9.dep.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: brace-expansion
-version: 5.0.6
+version: 5.0.9
 type: npm
 summary: Brace expansion as known from sh/bash
 homepage:
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/fast-xml-parser.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/fast-xml-parser.dep.yml
index 8f13da7..07fd88d 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/fast-xml-parser.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/fast-xml-parser.dep.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: fast-xml-parser
-version: 5.9.3
+version: 5.10.1
 type: npm
 summary: Validate XML, Parse XML, Build XML without C/C++ based libraries
 homepage:
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/is-unsafe.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/is-unsafe.dep.yml
index 02edc8d..a0e275d 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/is-unsafe.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/is-unsafe.dep.yml
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
 name: is-unsafe
-version: 1.0.1
+version: 2.0.0
 type: npm
 summary: Zero-dependency, DOM-free, pure predicate for detecting unsafe strings across
   HTML, XML, SVG, SQL, SHELL, and REGEX contexts
-homepage: 
+homepage:
 license: mit
 licenses:
 - sources: LICENSE
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/path-expression-matcher.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/path-expression-matcher.dep.yml
index e9671ff..a671e7d 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/path-expression-matcher.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/path-expression-matcher.dep.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: path-expression-matcher
-version: 1.5.0
+version: 1.6.2
 type: npm
 summary: Efficient path tracking and pattern matching for XML/JSON parsers
 homepage: https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/path-expression-matcher#readme
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/undici.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/undici.dep.yml
index c46a5c7..b339a44 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/undici.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/undici.dep.yml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: undici
-version: 6.27.0
+version: 6.28.0
 type: npm
 summary: An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
 homepage: https://undici.nodejs.org
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/xml-naming.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.1.0.dep.yml
similarity index 95%
rename from .licenses/npm/xml-naming.dep.yml
rename to .licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.1.0.dep.yml
index 6871fb5..6df51e8 100644
--- a/.licenses/npm/xml-naming.dep.yml
+++ b/.licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.1.0.dep.yml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ version: 0.1.0
 type: npm
 summary: Validates XML name productions — Name, NCName, QName, NMToken, NMTokens —
   for XML 1.0 and 1.1
-homepage: 
+homepage:
 license: mit
 licenses:
 - sources: README.md
diff --git a/.licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.3.0.dep.yml b/.licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.3.0.dep.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfc32c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.licenses/npm/xml-naming-0.3.0.dep.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+---
+name: xml-naming
+version: 0.3.0
+type: npm
+summary: Validates XML name productions — Name, NCName, QName, NMToken, NMTokens —
+  for XML 1.0 and 1.1
+homepage:
+license: mit
+licenses:
+- sources: LICENSE
+  text: |
+    MIT License
+
+    Copyright (c) 2026 Natural Intelligence
+
+    Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+    of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+    in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+    to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+    copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+    furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+    The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+    copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+    THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+    IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+    FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+    AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+    LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+    OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+    SOFTWARE.
+- sources: README.md
+  text: MIT
+notices: []
diff --git a/dist/cache-save/index.js b/dist/cache-save/index.js
index cec20dd..5894deb 100644
--- a/dist/cache-save/index.js
+++ b/dist/cache-save/index.js
@@ -7596,6 +7596,20 @@ var escClose = '\0CLOSE'+Math.random()+'\0';
 var escComma = '\0COMMA'+Math.random()+'\0';
 var escPeriod = '\0PERIOD'+Math.random()+'\0';
 
+var EXPANSION_MAX = 100000
+
+// `EXPANSION_MAX` caps the *number* of expansions, but not their length. An
+// input like `'{a,b}'.repeat(1500)` stays under that count - its output is
+// truncated to 100k results - while making every result ~1500 characters
+// long. The result set, and the intermediate arrays built while combining
+// brace sets, then grow large enough to exhaust memory and crash the process
+// (CVE-2026-14257). `EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH` bounds the total number of
+// characters the accumulator may hold at any point, so memory stays flat no
+// matter how many brace groups are chained. The limit sits well above any
+// realistic expansion (100k results hitting `EXPANSION_MAX` measure ~1M
+// characters) so legitimate input is unaffected.
+var EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH = 4000000
+
 function numeric(str) {
   return parseInt(str, 10) == str
     ? parseInt(str, 10)
@@ -7654,7 +7668,8 @@ function expandTop(str, options) {
     return [];
 
   options = options || {};
-  var max = options.max == null ? Infinity : options.max;
+  var max = options.max == null ? EXPANSION_MAX : options.max;
+  var maxLength = options.maxLength == null ? EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH : options.maxLength;
 
   // I don't know why Bash 4.3 does this, but it does.
   // Anything starting with {} will have the first two bytes preserved
@@ -7666,7 +7681,7 @@ function expandTop(str, options) {
     str = '\\{\\}' + str.substr(2);
   }
 
-  return expand(escapeBraces(str), max, true).map(unescapeBraces);
+  return expand(escapeBraces(str), max, maxLength, true).map(unescapeBraces);
 }
 
 function identity(e) {
@@ -7687,106 +7702,270 @@ function gte(i, y) {
   return i >= y;
 }
 
-function expand(str, max, isTop) {
-  var expansions = [];
-
-  var m = balanced('{', '}', str);
-  if (!m || /\$$/.test(m.pre)) return [str];
-
-  var isNumericSequence = /^-?\d+\.\.-?\d+(?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
-  var isAlphaSequence = /^[a-zA-Z]\.\.[a-zA-Z](?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
-  var isSequence = isNumericSequence || isAlphaSequence;
-  var isOptions = m.body.indexOf(',') >= 0;
-  if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
-    // {a},b}
-    if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
-      str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
-      return expand(str, max, true);
+// Build `{ acc[a] + pre + values[v] }` for every combination, capping the
+// number of results at `max` and the total number of characters at `maxLength`.
+// This is the one place output grows, so bounding it here keeps the single
+// accumulator - and therefore memory - flat regardless of how many brace groups
+// are combined (CVE-2026-14257).
+//
+// `base[a]` is the length of the part of `acc[a]` that predates the current
+// empty-drop baseline (see `expand`). The matching baselines for the results
+// are appended to `outBase`, which the caller carries forward alongside them.
+function combine(
+  acc,
+  base,
+  pre,
+  values,
+  max,
+  maxLength,
+  dropEmpties,
+  outBase
+) {
+  var out = []
+  var length = 0
+  for (var a = 0; a < acc.length; a++) {
+    for (var v = 0; v < values.length; v++) {
+      if (out.length >= max) return out
+      var expansion = acc[a] + pre + values[v]
+      // Bash drops empty results at the top level. Skip them before they count
+      // against `max`, so `max` bounds the number of *kept* results. "Empty"
+      // means "adds nothing past the baseline", not "empty overall".
+      if (dropEmpties && expansion.length === base[a]) continue
+      if (length + expansion.length > maxLength) return out
+      out.push(expansion)
+      outBase.push(base[a])
+      length += expansion.length
     }
-    return [str];
   }
+  return out
+}
 
-  var n;
-  if (isSequence) {
-    n = m.body.split(/\.\./);
-  } else {
-    n = parseCommaParts(m.body);
-    if (n.length === 1) {
-      // x{{a,b}}y ==> x{a}y x{b}y
-      n = expand(n[0], max, false).map(embrace);
-      if (n.length === 1) {
-        var post = m.post.length
-          ? expand(m.post, max, false)
-          : [''];
-        return post.map(function(p) {
-          return m.pre + n[0] + p;
-        });
+// The expansion values of a single numeric (`1..5`) or alphabetic (`a..e..2`)
+// sequence body.
+function expandSequence(
+  body,
+  isAlphaSequence,
+  max,
+  maxLength
+) {
+  var n = body.split(/\.\./)
+  var N = []
+  // A sequence body always splits into two or three parts, but the compiler
+  // can't know that.
+  /* c8 ignore start */
+  if (n[0] === undefined || n[1] === undefined) {
+    return N
+  }
+  /* c8 ignore stop */
+  var x = numeric(n[0])
+  var y = numeric(n[1])
+  var width = Math.max(n[0].length, n[1].length)
+  var incr =
+    n.length === 3 && n[2] !== undefined ?
+      Math.max(Math.abs(numeric(n[2])), 1)
+    : 1
+  var test = lte
+  var reverse = y < x
+  if (reverse) {
+    incr *= -1
+    test = gte
+  }
+  var pad = n.some(isPadded)
+
+  var length = 0
+  for (var i = x; test(i, y) && N.length < max; i += incr) {
+    var c
+    if (isAlphaSequence) {
+      c = String.fromCharCode(i)
+      if (c === '\\') {
+        c = ''
       }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // at this point, n is the parts, and we know it's not a comma set
-  // with a single entry.
-
-  // no need to expand pre, since it is guaranteed to be free of brace-sets
-  var pre = m.pre;
-  var post = m.post.length
-    ? expand(m.post, max, false)
-    : [''];
-
-  var N;
-
-  if (isSequence) {
-    var x = numeric(n[0]);
-    var y = numeric(n[1]);
-    var width = Math.max(n[0].length, n[1].length)
-    var incr = n.length == 3
-      ? Math.max(Math.abs(numeric(n[2])), 1)
-      : 1;
-    var test = lte;
-    var reverse = y < x;
-    if (reverse) {
-      incr *= -1;
-      test = gte;
-    }
-    var pad = n.some(isPadded);
-
-    N = [];
-
-    for (var i = x; test(i, y) && N.length < max; i += incr) {
-      var c;
-      if (isAlphaSequence) {
-        c = String.fromCharCode(i);
-        if (c === '\\')
-          c = '';
-      } else {
-        c = String(i);
-        if (pad) {
-          var need = width - c.length;
-          if (need > 0) {
-            var z = new Array(need + 1).join('0');
-            if (i < 0)
-              c = '-' + z + c.slice(1);
-            else
-              c = z + c;
+    } else {
+      c = String(i)
+      if (pad) {
+        var need = width - c.length
+        if (need > 0) {
+          var z = new Array(need + 1).join('0')
+          if (i < 0) {
+            c = '-' + z + c.slice(1)
+          } else {
+            c = z + c
           }
         }
       }
-      N.push(c);
     }
-  } else {
-    N = concatMap(n, function(el) { return expand(el, max, false) });
+    if (length + c.length > maxLength) break
+    N.push(c)
+    length += c.length
+  }
+  return N
+}
+
+function expand(
+  str,
+  max,
+  maxLength,
+  isTop
+) {
+  // Consume the string's top-level brace groups left to right, threading a
+  // running set of combined prefixes (`acc`). Expanding the tail iteratively -
+  // rather than recursing on `m.post` once per group - keeps the native stack
+  // depth constant, so deeply chained input (`'{a,b}'.repeat(3000)`) can no
+  // longer overflow the stack, and leaves a single accumulator whose size
+  // `maxLength` bounds directly (CVE-2026-14257).
+  var acc = ['']
+
+  // Bash drops empty results, but only when the *first* group of the run is a
+  // comma set - a sequence like `{a..\}` may legitimately yield ''. The drop
+  // is on the final strings, so it is applied to whichever `combine` produces
+  // them (the one with no brace set left in the tail).
+  //
+  // The old implementation recursed on `m.post`, so the drop tested only the
+  // expansion of the current call's substring. The `{a},b}` rewrite below turns
+  // `isTop` back on part-way through a string, starting a fresh such run, so
+  // the drop must ignore whatever `acc` already holds from earlier groups.
+  // `accBase[a]` records how much of `acc[a]` predates the current run;
+  // `combine` treats an expansion as empty when it adds nothing past that.
+  var accBase = [0]
+  var dropEmpties = false
+  var firstGroup = true
+  var nextBase
+
+  for (;;) {
+    var m = balanced('{', '}', str);
+
+    // No brace set left: the rest of the string is literal.
+    if (!m) {
+      return combine(acc, accBase, str, [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties, [])
+    }
+
+    // no need to expand pre, since it is guaranteed to be free of brace-sets
+    var pre = m.pre;
+
+    // For compatibility reasons, `${` is not eligible for brace expansion, and
+    // on the 1.x line it suppresses expansion of the rest of the string too:
+    // the whole remainder is literal. The 2.x and 5.x lines instead keep
+    // expanding the tail, which is what bash does, but changing that here would
+    // be a breaking change for 1.x consumers. Routed through `combine` so the
+    // result is still bounded by `max` and `maxLength`.
+    if (/\$$/.test(pre)) {
+      return combine(acc, accBase, str, [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties, [])
+    }
+
+    var isNumericSequence = /^-?\d+\.\.-?\d+(?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
+    var isAlphaSequence = /^[a-zA-Z]\.\.[a-zA-Z](?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
+    var isSequence = isNumericSequence || isAlphaSequence;
+    var isOptions = m.body.indexOf(',') >= 0;
+    if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
+      // {a},b}
+      if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
+        str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
+        // The rewritten string is expanded as if it were a fresh top-level one,
+        // so start a new empty-drop run: anchor the baseline at what `acc`
+        // holds now, and let the next expanding group decide whether to drop.
+        isTop = true
+        firstGroup = true
+        dropEmpties = false
+        accBase = []
+        for (var b = 0; b < acc.length; b++) {
+          accBase.push(acc[b].length)
+        }
+        continue
+      }
+      // Nothing here expands, so the whole remaining string is literal.
+      return combine(
+        acc,
+        accBase,
+        pre + '{' + m.body + '}' + m.post,
+        [''],
+        max,
+        maxLength,
+        dropEmpties,
+        []
+      )
+    }
+
+    if (firstGroup) {
+      dropEmpties = isTop && !isSequence
+      firstGroup = false
+    }
+
+    var values;
+    if (isSequence) {
+      values = expandSequence(m.body, isAlphaSequence, max, maxLength);
+    } else {
+      var n = parseCommaParts(m.body);
+      if (n.length === 1 && n[0] !== undefined) {
+        // x{{a,b}}y ==> x{a}y x{b}y
+        n = expand(n[0], max, maxLength, false).map(embrace);
+        //XXX is this necessary? Can't seem to hit it in tests.
+        /* c8 ignore start */
+        if (n.length === 1) {
+          nextBase = []
+          acc = combine(
+            acc,
+            accBase,
+            pre + n[0],
+            [''],
+            max,
+            maxLength,
+            dropEmpties && !m.post.length,
+            nextBase
+          )
+          accBase = nextBase
+          if (!m.post.length) break
+          str = m.post
+          continue
+        }
+        /* c8 ignore stop */
+      }
+
+      // Values that `combine` is going to drop as empty produce no result, so
+      // they must not count against `max` - otherwise `{a,,b}` with `max: 2`
+      // would stop at `['a', '']` and yield one result instead of two. Skipping
+      // them outright keeps `values` bounded while leaving `max` a bound on
+      // *kept* results. A value is dropped when it adds nothing past the
+      // baseline, which is what `combine` tests.
+      var dropsEmpties = dropEmpties && !m.post.length && !pre
+      for (var d = 0; dropsEmpties && d < acc.length; d++) {
+        if (acc[d].length !== accBase[d]) {
+          dropsEmpties = false
+        }
+      }
+
+      values = []
+      var valuesLength = 0
+      outer: for (var j = 0; j < n.length; j++) {
+        var expanded = expand(n[j], max, maxLength, false)
+        for (var k = 0; k < expanded.length; k++) {
+          var v = expanded[k]
+          if (dropsEmpties && !v) continue
+          if (values.length >= max || valuesLength + v.length > maxLength) {
+            break outer
+          }
+          values.push(v)
+          valuesLength += v.length
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    nextBase = []
+    acc = combine(
+      acc,
+      accBase,
+      pre,
+      values,
+      max,
+      maxLength,
+      dropEmpties && !m.post.length,
+      nextBase
+    )
+    accBase = nextBase
+    if (!m.post.length) break
+    str = m.post
   }
 
-  for (var j = 0; j < N.length; j++) {
-    for (var k = 0; k < post.length && expansions.length < max; k++) {
-      var expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k];
-      if (!isTop || isSequence || expansion)
-        expansions.push(expansion);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return expansions;
+  return acc
 }
 
 
@@ -14198,7 +14377,13 @@ function processHeader (request, key, val) {
       } else if (typeof val[i] === 'object') {
         throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)
       } else {
-        arr.push(`${val[i]}`)
+        // Coerce primitives (and reject unsafe coercions such as functions
+        // with a crafted toString/Symbol.toPrimitive).
+        const str = `${val[i]}`
+        if (!isValidHeaderValue(str)) {
+          throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)
+        }
+        arr.push(str)
       }
     }
     val = arr
@@ -14209,7 +14394,12 @@ function processHeader (request, key, val) {
   } else if (val === null) {
     val = ''
   } else {
+    // Coerce primitives (and reject unsafe coercions such as functions
+    // with a crafted toString/Symbol.toPrimitive).
     val = `${val}`
+    if (!isValidHeaderValue(val)) {
+      throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)
+    }
   }
 
   if (headerName === 'host') {
@@ -15581,6 +15771,7 @@ const {
   RequestContentLengthMismatchError,
   ResponseContentLengthMismatchError,
   RequestAbortedError,
+  InvalidArgumentError,
   HeadersTimeoutError,
   HeadersOverflowError,
   SocketError,
@@ -16564,8 +16755,16 @@ function writeH1 (client, request) {
     }
     body = bodyStream.stream
     contentLength = bodyStream.length
-  } else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null && body.type) {
-    headers.push('content-type', body.type)
+  } else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null) {
+    const contentType = body.type
+    if (contentType) {
+      const contentTypeValue = `${contentType}`
+      if (!util.isValidHeaderValue(contentTypeValue)) {
+        util.errorRequest(client, request, new InvalidArgumentError('invalid content-type header'))
+        return false
+      }
+      headers.push('content-type', contentTypeValue)
+    }
   }
 
   if (body && typeof body.read === 'function') {
@@ -20038,6 +20237,28 @@ function calculateRetryAfterHeader (retryAfter) {
   return new Date(retryAfter).getTime() - current
 }
 
+function validatePartialResponseContentLength (headers, range, statusCode, retryCount) {
+  const contentLength = headers['content-length']
+  if (contentLength == null) {
+    return null
+  }
+
+  if (!Number.isFinite(range.start) || !Number.isFinite(range.end)) {
+    return null
+  }
+
+  const length = Number(contentLength)
+  const expectedLength = range.end - range.start + 1
+  if (!Number.isFinite(length) || length !== expectedLength) {
+    return new RequestRetryError('Content-Length mismatch', statusCode, {
+      headers,
+      data: { count: retryCount }
+    })
+  }
+
+  return null
+}
+
 class RetryHandler {
   constructor (opts, handlers) {
     const { retryOptions, ...dispatchOpts } = opts
@@ -20252,6 +20473,12 @@ class RetryHandler {
         return false
       }
 
+      const contentLengthError = validatePartialResponseContentLength(headers, contentRange, statusCode, this.retryCount)
+      if (contentLengthError != null) {
+        this.abort(contentLengthError)
+        return false
+      }
+
       const { start, size, end = size - 1 } = contentRange
 
       assert(this.start === start, 'content-range mismatch')
@@ -20275,6 +20502,12 @@ class RetryHandler {
           )
         }
 
+        const contentLengthError = validatePartialResponseContentLength(headers, range, statusCode, this.retryCount)
+        if (contentLengthError != null) {
+          this.abort(contentLengthError)
+          return false
+        }
+
         const { start, size, end = size - 1 } = range
         assert(
           start != null && Number.isFinite(start),
@@ -24519,7 +24752,7 @@ function validateCookiePath (path) {
 
     if (
       code < 0x20 || // exclude CTLs (0-31)
-      code === 0x7F || // DEL
+      code > 0x7E || // exclude DEL and non-ascii
       code === 0x3B // ;
     ) {
       throw new Error('Invalid cookie path')
@@ -24528,16 +24761,80 @@ function validateCookiePath (path) {
 }
 
 /**
- * I have no idea why these values aren't allowed to be honest,
- * but Deno tests these. - Khafra
+ * <let-dig> ::= <letter> | <digit>
+ *
+ * <letter> ::= any one of the 52 alphabetic characters A through Z in
+ * upper case and a through z in lower case
+ *
+ * <digit> ::= any one of the ten digits 0 through 9r
+ *
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034#section-3.5
+ * @param {number} code
+ */
+function isLetterOrDigit (code) {
+  return (
+    (code >= 0x30 && code <= 0x39) || // 0-9
+    (code >= 0x41 && code <= 0x5A) || // A-Z
+    (code >= 0x61 && code <= 0x7A) // a-z
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates a cookie domain against the "preferred name syntax".
+ *
+ * <domain>      ::= <subdomain> | " "
+ * <subdomain>   ::= <label> | <subdomain> "." <label>
+ * <label>       ::= <let-dig> [ [ <ldh-str> ] <let-dig> ]
+ * <ldh-str>     ::= <let-dig-hyp> | <let-dig-hyp> <ldh-str>
+ * <let-dig-hyp> ::= <let-dig> | "-"
+ *
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034#section-3.5
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1123#section-2.1
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035#section-2.3.4
  * @param {string} domain
  */
 function validateCookieDomain (domain) {
-  if (
-    domain.startsWith('-') ||
-    domain.endsWith('.') ||
-    domain.endsWith('-')
-  ) {
+  // <domain> ::= <subdomain> | " "
+  if (domain === ' ') {
+    return
+  }
+
+  if (domain.length > 255) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+  }
+
+  let labelLength = 0
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < domain.length; ++i) {
+    const code = domain.charCodeAt(i)
+
+    if (code === 0x2E) {
+      if (labelLength === 0) {
+        throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+      }
+
+      if (domain.charCodeAt(i - 1) === 0x2D) { // "-"
+        throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+      }
+
+      labelLength = 0
+      continue
+    }
+
+    if (labelLength === 0 && !isLetterOrDigit(code)) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+    }
+
+    if (!isLetterOrDigit(code) && code !== 0x2D) { // "-"
+      throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+    }
+
+    if (++labelLength > 63) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (labelLength === 0 || domain.charCodeAt(domain.length - 1) === 0x2D) { // "-"
     throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
   }
 }
@@ -24680,7 +24977,13 @@ function stringify (cookie) {
 
     const [key, ...value] = part.split('=')
 
-    out.push(`${key.trim()}=${value.join('=')}`)
+    const trimmedKey = key.trim()
+    const joinedValue = value.join('=')
+
+    validateCookieName(trimmedKey)
+    validateCookieValue(joinedValue)
+
+    out.push(`${trimmedKey}=${joinedValue}`)
   }
 
   return out.join('; ')
@@ -52201,6 +52504,26 @@ class MatcherView {
     return current.values !== undefined && attrName in current.values;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Get the value of a "kept" attribute from the nearest ancestor (or
+   * current node) that declared it via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {*}
+   */
+  getAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    return this._matcher.getAnyParentAttr(attrName);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check whether any ancestor (or the current node) kept the given
+   * attribute via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  hasAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    return this._matcher.hasAnyParentAttr(attrName);
+  }
+
   /**
    * Get current node's sibling position (child index in parent).
    * @returns {number}
@@ -52309,6 +52632,9 @@ class Matcher {
     // Each siblingStacks entry: Map<tagName, count> tracking occurrences at each level
     this._pathStringCache = null;
     this._view = new MatcherView(this);
+
+    // Kept-attribute stack: only populated when push() is called with options.keep.
+    this._keptAttrs = [];
   }
 
   /**
@@ -52316,8 +52642,10 @@ class Matcher {
    * @param {string} tagName
    * @param {Object|null} [attrValues=null]
    * @param {string|null} [namespace=null]
+   * @param {Object|null} [options=null]
+   * @param {string[]} [options.keep] - Names of attributes (from attrValues)
    */
-  push(tagName, attrValues = null, namespace = null) {
+  push(tagName, attrValues = null, namespace = null, options = null) {
     this._pathStringCache = null;
 
     // Remove values from previous current node (now becoming ancestor)
@@ -52327,26 +52655,29 @@ class Matcher {
 
     // Get or create sibling tracking for current level
     const currentLevel = this.path.length;
-    if (!this.siblingStacks[currentLevel]) {
-      this.siblingStacks[currentLevel] = new Map();
+    let level = this.siblingStacks[currentLevel];
+    if (!level) {
+      // `counts` tells same-name siblings apart (the "counter" — nth <item>
+      // among other <item>s). `total` is every child seen at this level so
+      // far, kept as a running number instead of re-added from `counts` on
+      // every push — a parent with many differently-named children would
+      // otherwise cost more per child the more distinct names it has.
+      level = { counts: new Map(), total: 0 };
+      this.siblingStacks[currentLevel] = level;
     }
 
-    const siblings = this.siblingStacks[currentLevel];
-
     // Create a unique key for sibling tracking that includes namespace
     const siblingKey = namespace ? `${namespace}:${tagName}` : tagName;
 
     // Calculate counter (how many times this tag appeared at this level)
-    const counter = siblings.get(siblingKey) || 0;
+    const counter = level.counts.get(siblingKey) || 0;
 
-    // Calculate position (total children at this level so far)
-    let position = 0;
-    for (const count of siblings.values()) {
-      position += count;
-    }
+    // Position = total children at this level seen before this one.
+    const position = level.total;
 
-    // Update sibling count for this tag
-    siblings.set(siblingKey, counter + 1);
+    // Update sibling count for this tag, and the level's running total.
+    level.counts.set(siblingKey, counter + 1);
+    level.total++;
 
     // Create new node
     const node = {
@@ -52364,6 +52695,24 @@ class Matcher {
     }
 
     this.path.push(node);
+
+    // Depth of the node we just pushed (1-based, matches this.path.length)
+    const depth = this.path.length;
+
+    // Copy only the requested attributes into the kept-attrs stack. This is
+    // the one part of push() whose cost scales with input (O(keep.length))
+    // rather than being O(1) — by design, since the caller is explicitly
+    // opting in for specific attribute names. No options/keep => zero added
+    // cost beyond the two property reads below.
+    const keep = options !== null ? options.keep : null;
+    if (keep !== null && keep !== undefined && keep.length > 0 && attrValues) {
+      for (let i = 0; i < keep.length; i++) {
+        const name = keep[i];
+        if (attrValues[name] !== undefined) {
+          this._keptAttrs.push({ depth, name, value: attrValues[name] });
+        }
+      }
+    }
   }
 
   /**
@@ -52380,6 +52729,18 @@ class Matcher {
       this.siblingStacks.length = this.path.length + 1;
     }
 
+    // Drop any kept attributes that belonged to the popped node (or deeper).
+    // _keptAttrs is depth-ordered (push only ever appends increasing depths),
+    // so this is a backward scan that stops at the first surviving entry —
+    // typically O(1) since kept attrs are rare by design.
+    const poppedDepth = this.path.length + 1;
+    while (
+      this._keptAttrs.length > 0 &&
+      this._keptAttrs[this._keptAttrs.length - 1].depth >= poppedDepth
+    ) {
+      this._keptAttrs.pop();
+    }
+
     return node;
   }
 
@@ -52434,6 +52795,38 @@ class Matcher {
     return current.values !== undefined && attrName in current.values;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Get the value of a "kept" attribute from the nearest ancestor (or
+   * current node) that declared it via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * Unlike getAttrValue(), this works regardless of how deep the path has
+   * gone since the attribute was pushed — but only for attribute names that
+   * were explicitly marked with `keep` at push time. Cost is proportional to
+   * the number of currently-kept attributes (typically 0-3), not path depth.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {*} the value, or undefined if no ancestor kept this attribute
+   */
+  getAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    const kept = this._keptAttrs;
+    for (let i = kept.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+      if (kept[i].name === attrName) return kept[i].value;
+    }
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check whether any ancestor (or the current node) kept the given
+   * attribute via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  hasAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    const kept = this._keptAttrs;
+    for (let i = kept.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+      if (kept[i].name === attrName) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+
   /**
    * Get current node's sibling position (child index in parent).
    * @returns {number}
@@ -52510,6 +52903,7 @@ class Matcher {
     this._pathStringCache = null;
     this.path = [];
     this.siblingStacks = [];
+    this._keptAttrs = [];
   }
 
   /**
@@ -52659,7 +53053,8 @@ class Matcher {
   snapshot() {
     return {
       path: this.path.map(node => ({ ...node })),
-      siblingStacks: this.siblingStacks.map(map => new Map(map))
+      siblingStacks: this.siblingStacks.map(level => level ? { counts: new Map(level.counts), total: level.total } : level),
+      keptAttrs: this._keptAttrs.map(entry => ({ ...entry }))
     };
   }
 
@@ -52670,7 +53065,8 @@ class Matcher {
   restore(snapshot) {
     this._pathStringCache = null;
     this.path = snapshot.path.map(node => ({ ...node }));
-    this.siblingStacks = snapshot.siblingStacks.map(map => new Map(map));
+    this.siblingStacks = snapshot.siblingStacks.map(level => level ? { counts: new Map(level.counts), total: level.total } : level);
+    this._keptAttrs = (snapshot.keptAttrs || []).map(entry => ({ ...entry }));
   }
 
   /**
@@ -52693,6 +53089,7 @@ class Matcher {
     return this._view;
   }
 }
+
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/fast-xml-builder/src/util.js
 
 
@@ -54674,6 +55071,389 @@ class XmlNode {
   }
 }
 
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/fast-xml-parser/node_modules/xml-naming/src/index.js
+/**
+ * xml-naming
+ * Validates XML Name productions as defined in the XML 1.0 and 1.1 specifications.
+ * Covers: Name, NCName, QName, NMToken, NMTokens
+ *
+ * XML 1.0 spec: https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-Name
+ * XML 1.1 spec: https://www.w3.org/TR/xml11/#NT-NameStartChar
+ * XML NS spec:  https://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/#NT-NCName
+ */
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Character class strings — XML 1.0
+//
+// NameStartChar ::= ":" | [A-Z] | "_" | [a-z]
+//   | [#xC0-#xD6]   | [#xD8-#xF6]   | [#xF8-#x2FF]
+//   | [#x370-#x37D] | [#x37F-#x1FFF]    <- split to exclude #x0487
+//   | [#x200C-#x200D]
+//   | [#x2070-#x218F] | [#x2C00-#x2FEF]
+//   | [#x3001-#xD7FF] | [#xF900-#xFDCF] | [#xFDF0-#xFFFD]
+//
+// NameChar ::= NameStartChar | "-" | "." | [0-9]
+//   | #xB7 | [#x0300-#x036F] | [#x203F-#x2040]
+//
+// Note: \u0487 (Combining Cyrillic Millions Sign) was added in Unicode 4.0,
+// after XML 1.0 was defined against Unicode 2.0. It falls inside the range
+// \u037F-\u1FFF but must be excluded. We split that range into
+// \u037F-\u0486 and \u0488-\u1FFF to exclude it explicitly.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_nameStartChar10 =
+  ':A-Za-z_' +
+  '\u00C0-\u00D6\u00D8-\u00F6\u00F8-\u02FF' +
+  '\u0370-\u037D' +
+  '\u037F-\u0486\u0488-\u1FFF' +  // split to exclude \u0487
+  '\u200C-\u200D' +
+  '\u2070-\u218F' +
+  '\u2C00-\u2FEF' +
+  '\u3001-\uD7FF' +
+  '\uF900-\uFDCF' +
+  '\uFDF0-\uFFFD';
+
+const src_nameChar10 =
+  src_nameStartChar10 +
+  '\\-\\.\\d' +
+  '\u00B7' +
+  '\u0300-\u036F' +
+  '\u203F-\u2040';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Character class strings — XML 1.1
+//
+// Differences from XML 1.0:
+//
+// NameStartChar:
+//   1.0 has split ranges: \u00C0-\u00D6, \u00D8-\u00F6, \u00F8-\u02FF
+//   1.1 merges them into: \u00C0-\u02FF
+//   (\u00D7 x and \u00F7 / are division symbols, excluded in both versions)
+//
+//   1.0 tops out at \uFFFD (BMP only)
+//   1.1 adds \u{10000}-\u{EFFFF} (supplementary planes)
+//   These require the /u flag on the RegExp — see buildRegexes below.
+//
+// NameChar:
+//   1.1 adds \u0487 (Combining Cyrillic Millions Sign, added in Unicode 4.0)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_nameStartChar11 =
+  ':A-Za-z_' +
+  '\u00C0-\u02FF' +                    // merged — 1.0 had three split ranges here
+  '\u0370-\u037D' +
+  '\u037F-\u0486\u0488-\u1FFF' +       // split to exclude \u0487 (combining mark, never a NameStartChar)
+  '\u200C-\u200D' +
+  '\u2070-\u218F' +
+  '\u2C00-\u2FEF' +
+  '\u3001-\uD7FF' +
+  '\uF900-\uFDCF' +
+  '\uFDF0-\uFFFD' +
+  '\u{10000}-\u{EFFFF}';     // supplementary planes — REQUIRES /u flag on RegExp
+
+const src_nameChar11 =
+  src_nameStartChar11 +
+  '\\-\\.\\d' +
+  '\u00B7' +
+  '\u0300-\u036F' +
+  '\u0487' +                 // Combining Cyrillic Millions Sign — valid in 1.1, not 1.0
+  '\u203F-\u2040';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Regex builders
+//
+// XML 1.0 regexes: no flags — BMP only, standard JS regex behaviour.
+// XML 1.1 regexes: /u flag — required for \u{10000}-\u{EFFFF} to match actual
+//   supplementary code points rather than lone surrogates (which are illegal XML).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_buildRegexes = (startChar, char, flags = '') => {
+  const ncStart = startChar.replace(':', '');
+  const ncChar = char.replace(':', '');
+  const ncNamePat = `[${ncStart}][${ncChar}]*`;
+
+  return {
+    name: new RegExp(`^[${startChar}][${char}]*$`, flags),
+    ncName: new RegExp(`^${ncNamePat}$`, flags),
+    qName: new RegExp(`^${ncNamePat}(?::${ncNamePat})?$`, flags),
+    nmToken: new RegExp(`^[${char}]+$`, flags),
+    nmTokens: new RegExp(`^[${char}]+(?:\\s+[${char}]+)*$`, flags),
+  };
+};
+
+const src_regexes10 = src_buildRegexes(src_nameStartChar10, src_nameChar10);       // no /u — BMP only
+const src_regexes11 = src_buildRegexes(src_nameStartChar11, src_nameChar11, 'u');  // /u — enables \u{10000}-\u{EFFFF}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// ASCII-only fast path (opt-in, off by default)
+//
+// The XML 1.0 vs 1.1 NameStartChar/NameChar productions differ *only* in
+// their non-ASCII ranges (merged vs split Latin-1 ranges, \u0487, and
+// supplementary planes). Restricted to ASCII, both versions collapse to the
+// same character classes, so a single regex pair covers both xmlVersion
+// values — no /u flag needed.
+//
+// Rationale: unicode-aware regexes (the /u flag, required for XML 1.1's
+// supplementary-plane range) are measurably slower in V8 than plain
+// non-unicode regexes on the same input, even when the input is pure ASCII.
+// For the common case — HTML/SVG ids, XML tags — names are ASCII, so callers
+// who know this can opt in to skip the unicode-aware matching path entirely.
+// This is a real but *conditional* win: mainly for XML 1.1 input (avoids /u),
+// or at scale where the larger unicode character classes add engine
+// overhead. It also changes behaviour (rejects legitimate non-ASCII XML
+// 1.0/1.1 names), so it must never be silently enabled — hence off by
+// default.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const nameStartCharAscii = ':A-Za-z_';
+const nameCharAscii = nameStartCharAscii + '\\-\\.\\d';
+
+const regexesAscii = src_buildRegexes(nameStartCharAscii, nameCharAscii); // no /u — ASCII only
+
+const src_getRegexes = (xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false) => {
+  if (asciiOnly) return regexesAscii;
+  return xmlVersion === '1.1' ? src_regexes11 : src_regexes10;
+};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Boolean validators
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid XML Name.
+ * Colons are allowed anywhere (Name production).
+ * Used for: DOCTYPE entity names, notation names, DTD element declarations.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
+ */
+const xml_naming_src_name = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).name.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid NCName (Non-Colonized Name).
+ * Colons are not permitted.
+ * Used for: namespace prefixes, local names, SVG id attributes.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
+ */
+const src_ncName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).ncName.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid QName (Qualified Name).
+ * Allows exactly one colon as a prefix separator: prefix:localName.
+ * Used for: element and attribute names in namespace-aware XML/SVG.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
+ */
+const src_qName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).qName.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid NMToken.
+ * Like Name but no restriction on the first character.
+ * Used for: DTD NMTOKEN attribute values.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
+ */
+const src_nmToken = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).nmToken.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid NMTokens value.
+ * A whitespace-separated list of NMToken values.
+ * Used for: DTD NMTOKENS attribute values.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
+ */
+const src_nmTokens = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).nmTokens.test(str);
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Memoized validator factory
+//
+// Real documents reuse a small vocabulary of tag/attribute names across many
+// siblings (e.g. `id`, `class`, `href` repeated across hundreds of elements).
+// The plain boolean validators above re-run the regex on every call
+// regardless of repeats. `createValidator` returns a closure with a private
+// string -> boolean cache, so repeated names after the first become O(1)
+// lookups instead of regex tests.
+//
+// - opts (xmlVersion, asciiOnly) are fixed at creation time, so the regex is
+//   resolved once, not on every call.
+// - The cache is private to the returned closure — no shared/global state,
+//   no cross-caller pollution.
+// - `maxCacheSize` bounds memory: once the cache reaches this many entries,
+//   it stops accepting new ones (existing entries keep serving hits; new
+//   misses just fall through to the regex, uncached). This avoids unbounded
+//   growth against adversarial/high-cardinality input (e.g. validating
+//   attacker-supplied names with no repeats) without the cost/complexity of
+//   a full LRU, and without the perf cliff of reset-and-refill thrashing.
+// - Call `.reset()` on the returned function to clear the cache manually
+//   (e.g. between unrelated parse calls).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_PRODUCTIONS = (/* unused pure expression or super */ null && (['name', 'ncName', 'qName', 'nmToken', 'nmTokens']));
+
+/**
+ * Returns a memoized boolean validator function for a single production,
+ * with opts fixed at creation time.
+ *
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean, maxCacheSize?: number }} [opts]
+ *   maxCacheSize: max number of distinct strings to cache (default 2048).
+ *   Once reached, new strings are validated but not cached; existing cached
+ *   entries keep being served.
+ * @returns {((str: string) => boolean) & { reset: () => void }}
+ */
+const createValidator = (production, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false, maxCacheSize = 2048 } = {}) => {
+  if (!src_PRODUCTIONS.includes(production)) {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      `Unknown production "${production}". Must be one of: ${src_PRODUCTIONS.join(', ')}`
+    );
+  }
+
+  const regex = src_getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly)[production];
+  let cache = new Map();
+
+  const validator = (str) => {
+    const cached = cache.get(str);
+    if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
+
+    const result = regex.test(str);
+    if (cache.size < maxCacheSize) cache.set(str, result);
+    return result;
+  };
+
+  validator.reset = () => { cache = new Map(); };
+
+  return validator;
+};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Diagnostic validator
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Validates a string against a named production and returns a detailed result.
+ *
+ * @param {string} str
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, production: string, input: string, reason?: string, position?: number }}
+ */
+const src_validate = (str, production, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) => {
+  if (!src_PRODUCTIONS.includes(production)) {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      `Unknown production "${production}". Must be one of: ${src_PRODUCTIONS.join(', ')}`
+    );
+  }
+
+  const validators = { name: xml_naming_src_name, ncName: src_ncName, qName: src_qName, nmToken: src_nmToken, nmTokens: src_nmTokens };
+  const isValid = validators[production](str, { xmlVersion, asciiOnly });
+
+  if (isValid) return { valid: true, production, input: str };
+
+  let reason = 'Does not match the production rules';
+  let position;
+
+  // Diagnostic fallback char checks must mirror the same character set the
+  // boolean validator above used, or the reported reason/position could
+  // contradict the `valid: false` result (e.g. flagging a char as illegal
+  // that the unicode-aware check would have accepted).
+  const startCharPattern = asciiOnly ? /^[:A-Za-z_]/ : /^[:A-Za-z_\u00C0-\uFFFD]/;
+  const namePattern = asciiOnly ? /[\w\-\\.:]/ : /[\w\-\\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/;
+
+  if (str.length === 0) {
+    reason = 'Input is empty';
+  } else if (production === 'ncName' && str.includes(':')) {
+    position = str.indexOf(':');
+    reason = 'Colon is not allowed in NCName';
+  } else if (production === 'qName' && str.startsWith(':')) {
+    reason = 'QName cannot start with a colon';
+    position = 0;
+  } else if (production === 'qName' && str.endsWith(':')) {
+    reason = 'QName cannot end with a colon';
+    position = str.length - 1;
+  } else if (production === 'qName' && (str.match(/:/g) || []).length > 1) {
+    reason = 'QName can have at most one colon';
+    position = str.lastIndexOf(':');
+  } else if (
+    ['name', 'ncName', 'qName'].includes(production) &&
+    !startCharPattern.test(str[0])
+  ) {
+    reason = `First character "${str[0]}" is not a valid NameStartChar`;
+    position = 0;
+  } else {
+    for (let i = 0; i < str.length; i++) {
+      if (!namePattern.test(str[i])) {
+        reason = `Character "${str[i]}" at position ${i} is not a valid NameChar`;
+        position = i;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { valid: false, production, input: str, reason, position };
+};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Batch validator
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Validates an array of strings against a named production.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} strings
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ * @returns {Array<{ valid: boolean, production: string, input: string, reason?: string, position?: number }>}
+ */
+const src_validateAll = (strings, production, opts = {}) =>
+  strings.map(str => src_validate(str, production, opts));
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Sanitizer
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Transforms an invalid string into the nearest valid XML name for the given production.
+ *
+ * @param {string} str
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ replacement?: string, asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: also replace any non-ASCII character, not just XML-illegal
+ *   ones (default false).
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+const src_sanitize = (str, production = 'name', { replacement = '_', asciiOnly = false } = {}) => {
+  if (!str) return replacement;
+
+  let result = str;
+
+  // Strip colons for NCName
+  if (production === 'ncName') {
+    result = result.replace(/:/g, '');
+  }
+
+  // Replace illegal characters
+  const allowedCharPattern = asciiOnly ? /[^\w\-\.:]/g : /[^\w\-\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/g;
+  result = result.replace(allowedCharPattern, replacement);
+
+  // Fix invalid start character for Name / NCName / QName
+  if (production !== 'nmToken' && production !== 'nmTokens') {
+    if (/^[\-\.\d]/.test(result)) {
+      result = replacement + result;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result || replacement;
+};
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/fast-xml-parser/src/xmlparser/DocTypeReader.js
 
 
@@ -54907,7 +55687,7 @@ class DocTypeReader {
         let elementName = xmlData.substring(startIndex, i);
 
         // Validate element name
-        if (!this.suppressValidationErr && !qName(elementName, { xmlVersion: this.xmlVersion })) {
+        if (!this.suppressValidationErr && !src_qName(elementName, { xmlVersion: this.xmlVersion })) {
             throw new Error(`Invalid element name: "${elementName}"`);
         }
 
@@ -55081,7 +55861,7 @@ function hasSeq(data, seq, i) {
 }
 
 function validateEntityName(name, xmlVersion) {
-    if (qName(name, { xmlVersion: xmlVersion }))
+    if (src_qName(name, { xmlVersion: xmlVersion }))
         return name;
     else
         throw new Error(`Invalid entity name ${name}`);
@@ -55568,6 +56348,9 @@ class ExpressionSet {
     /** @type {import('./Expression.js').default[]} expressions containing deep wildcard (..) */
     this._deepWildcards = [];
 
+    /** @type {Map<string, import('./Expression.js').default[]>} terminalTag → deep wildcard expressions */
+    this._deepByTerminalTag = new Map();
+
     /** @type {Set<string>} pattern strings already added — used for deduplication */
     this._patterns = new Set();
 
@@ -55599,7 +56382,14 @@ class ExpressionSet {
     this._patterns.add(expression.pattern);
 
     if (expression.hasDeepWildcard()) {
-      this._deepWildcards.push(expression);
+      const lastSeg = expression.segments[expression.segments.length - 1];
+      if (lastSeg && lastSeg.type !== 'deep-wildcard' && lastSeg.tag !== '*') {
+        const tag = lastSeg.tag;
+        if (!this._deepByTerminalTag.has(tag)) this._deepByTerminalTag.set(tag, []);
+        this._deepByTerminalTag.get(tag).push(expression);
+      } else {
+        this._deepWildcards.push(expression);
+      }
       return this;
     }
 
@@ -55733,7 +56523,13 @@ class ExpressionSet {
       }
     }
 
-    // 3. Deep wildcards — cannot be pre-filtered by depth or tag
+    // 3. Deep wildcards — indexed by terminal tag, then unindexed fallback
+    const deepBucket = this._deepByTerminalTag.get(tag);
+    if (deepBucket) {
+      for (let i = 0; i < deepBucket.length; i++) {
+        if (matcher.matches(deepBucket[i])) return deepBucket[i];
+      }
+    }
     for (let i = 0; i < this._deepWildcards.length; i++) {
       if (matcher.matches(this._deepWildcards[i])) return this._deepWildcards[i];
     }
@@ -56849,26 +57645,6 @@ const MISC_SYMBOLS = {
   nVDash: '⊯',
 };
 
-/**
- * All entities combined (if you need everything)
- * @type {Record<string, string>}
- */
-const ALL_ENTITIES = {
-  ...BASIC_LATIN,
-  ...LATIN_ACCENTS,
-  ...LATIN_EXTENDED,
-  ...GREEK,
-  ...CYRILLIC,
-  ...MATH,
-  ...MATH_ADVANCED,
-  ...ARROWS,
-  ...SHAPES,
-  ...PUNCTUATION,
-  ...CURRENCY,
-  ...FRACTIONS,
-  ...MISC_SYMBOLS,
-};
-
 const XML = {
   amp: "&",
   apos: "'",
@@ -57547,6 +58323,152 @@ class EntityDecoder {
     return this._applyNCRAction(effective, token, cp);
   }
 }
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql.js
+/**
+ * SQL context patterns — high-precision rules only.
+ *
+ * These rules have very low false-positive risk and are safe to apply to
+ * general user text (names, descriptions, search queries, etc.).
+ * All patterns are ReDoS-safe — unlike the `sql-injection` npm package
+ * which has an active CVE on its own detection regexes.
+ *
+ * For exhaustive coverage including noisier heuristics (comment sequences,
+ * hex literals, stacked queries with semicolons), use 'SQL-STRICT' instead.
+ * Apply 'SQL-STRICT' only to strings that are specifically SQL fragments,
+ * not to general free-text fields.
+ */
+
+const SQL_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    id: 'sql-block-comment-open',
+    description: 'SQL block comment open: /* ... */ — unusual in legitimate user text',
+    pattern: /\/\*/,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-union-select',
+    description: 'UNION SELECT — most common SQL injection aggregation attack',
+    pattern: /\bUNION\s{1,20}(?:ALL\s{1,20})?SELECT\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-drop-table',
+    description: 'DROP TABLE — destructive DDL injection',
+    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}TABLE\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-drop-database',
+    description: 'DROP DATABASE — destructive DDL injection',
+    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}DATABASE\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-insert-into',
+    description: 'INSERT INTO — data injection',
+    pattern: /\bINSERT\s{1,20}INTO\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-delete-from',
+    description: 'DELETE FROM — data deletion injection',
+    pattern: /\bDELETE\s{1,20}FROM\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-update-set',
+    description: 'UPDATE ... SET — data modification injection',
+    // Allows arbitrary content between UPDATE and SET (table name, alias, etc.)
+    pattern: /\bUPDATE\b[\s\S]{1,60}\bSET\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-exec-xp',
+    description: 'EXEC xp_ — MSSQL extended stored procedure execution',
+    pattern: /\bEXEC(?:UTE)?\s{1,20}xp_/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-tautology-string',
+    description: "Classic string tautology: ' OR '1'='1 or \" OR \"1\"=\"1\"",
+    // Last quote is optional — injection may truncate it: ' OR '1'='1--
+    pattern: /'\s{0,10}OR\s{0,10}'[^']{0,20}'\s*=\s*'[^']{0,20}/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-tautology-numeric',
+    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 1=1',
+    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}1\s*=\s*1\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-always-true-zero',
+    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 0=0',
+    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}0\s*=\s*0\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-sleep-benchmark',
+    description: 'Time-based blind injection: SLEEP() or BENCHMARK()',
+    pattern: /\b(?:SLEEP|BENCHMARK)\s*\(/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-waitfor-delay',
+    description: 'MSSQL time-based blind injection: WAITFOR DELAY',
+    pattern: /\bWAITFOR\s{1,20}DELAY\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-char-function',
+    description: 'CHAR() function — used to obfuscate injected strings',
+    pattern: /\bCHAR\s*\(\s*\d{1,3}/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-information-schema',
+    description: 'INFORMATION_SCHEMA — reconnaissance query for table/column enumeration',
+    pattern: /\bINFORMATION_SCHEMA\b/i,
+  },
+];
+
+/* harmony default export */ const sql = (SQL_PATTERNS);
+
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql-strict.js
+/**
+ * SQL-STRICT context patterns.
+ *
+ * Extends the base 'SQL' context with three additional rules that are
+ * effective at detecting real injections but carry a higher false-positive
+ * risk on general free-text input.
+ *
+ * Use 'SQL-STRICT' when:
+ *   - The string is specifically a SQL fragment or database identifier
+ *   - You control the input domain (e.g. a dedicated SQL search field)
+ *   - You can tolerate occasional false positives in exchange for broader coverage
+ *
+ * Use 'SQL' (not STRICT) when:
+ *   - The field is general user text (names, descriptions, comments)
+ *   - False positives would block legitimate content (e.g. "see note -- above")
+ *
+ * Rules moved here from 'SQL' due to false-positive risk:
+ *
+ *   sql-line-comment   — "--" fires on "see note -- above", "value--", CSS var(--primary)
+ *   sql-stacked-query  — "; SELECT" fires on legitimate prose with semicolons + SQL words
+ *   sql-hex-encoding   — "0xDEAD" fires on hex values in technical docs and log output
+ */
+
+
+
+const SQL_STRICT_EXTRA = [
+  {
+    id: 'sql-line-comment',
+    description: 'SQL line comment: -- followed by whitespace or end of string',
+    pattern: /--(?:\s|$)/,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-stacked-query',
+    description: 'Stacked queries: semicolon immediately followed by a SQL keyword',
+    pattern: /;\s{0,10}(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|CREATE|ALTER|EXEC)\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-hex-encoding',
+    description: 'Hex-encoded string injection: 0x41414141 style (MySQL)',
+    pattern: /\b0x[0-9a-f]{4,}/i,
+  },
+];
+
+// SQL-STRICT = all base SQL rules + the three noisy extras
+const SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS = [...sql, ...SQL_STRICT_EXTRA];
+
+/* harmony default export */ const sql_strict = (SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS);
+
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/html.js
 /**
  * HTML context patterns.
@@ -57814,152 +58736,6 @@ const SVG_PATTERNS = [
 
 /* harmony default export */ const svg = (SVG_PATTERNS);
 
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql.js
-/**
- * SQL context patterns — high-precision rules only.
- *
- * These rules have very low false-positive risk and are safe to apply to
- * general user text (names, descriptions, search queries, etc.).
- * All patterns are ReDoS-safe — unlike the `sql-injection` npm package
- * which has an active CVE on its own detection regexes.
- *
- * For exhaustive coverage including noisier heuristics (comment sequences,
- * hex literals, stacked queries with semicolons), use 'SQL-STRICT' instead.
- * Apply 'SQL-STRICT' only to strings that are specifically SQL fragments,
- * not to general free-text fields.
- */
-
-const SQL_PATTERNS = [
-  {
-    id: 'sql-block-comment-open',
-    description: 'SQL block comment open: /* ... */ — unusual in legitimate user text',
-    pattern: /\/\*/,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-union-select',
-    description: 'UNION SELECT — most common SQL injection aggregation attack',
-    pattern: /\bUNION\s{1,20}(?:ALL\s{1,20})?SELECT\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-drop-table',
-    description: 'DROP TABLE — destructive DDL injection',
-    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}TABLE\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-drop-database',
-    description: 'DROP DATABASE — destructive DDL injection',
-    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}DATABASE\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-insert-into',
-    description: 'INSERT INTO — data injection',
-    pattern: /\bINSERT\s{1,20}INTO\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-delete-from',
-    description: 'DELETE FROM — data deletion injection',
-    pattern: /\bDELETE\s{1,20}FROM\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-update-set',
-    description: 'UPDATE ... SET — data modification injection',
-    // Allows arbitrary content between UPDATE and SET (table name, alias, etc.)
-    pattern: /\bUPDATE\b[\s\S]{1,60}\bSET\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-exec-xp',
-    description: 'EXEC xp_ — MSSQL extended stored procedure execution',
-    pattern: /\bEXEC(?:UTE)?\s{1,20}xp_/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-tautology-string',
-    description: "Classic string tautology: ' OR '1'='1 or \" OR \"1\"=\"1\"",
-    // Last quote is optional — injection may truncate it: ' OR '1'='1--
-    pattern: /'\s{0,10}OR\s{0,10}'[^']{0,20}'\s*=\s*'[^']{0,20}/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-tautology-numeric',
-    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 1=1',
-    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}1\s*=\s*1\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-always-true-zero',
-    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 0=0',
-    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}0\s*=\s*0\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-sleep-benchmark',
-    description: 'Time-based blind injection: SLEEP() or BENCHMARK()',
-    pattern: /\b(?:SLEEP|BENCHMARK)\s*\(/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-waitfor-delay',
-    description: 'MSSQL time-based blind injection: WAITFOR DELAY',
-    pattern: /\bWAITFOR\s{1,20}DELAY\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-char-function',
-    description: 'CHAR() function — used to obfuscate injected strings',
-    pattern: /\bCHAR\s*\(\s*\d{1,3}/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-information-schema',
-    description: 'INFORMATION_SCHEMA — reconnaissance query for table/column enumeration',
-    pattern: /\bINFORMATION_SCHEMA\b/i,
-  },
-];
-
-/* harmony default export */ const sql = (SQL_PATTERNS);
-
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql-strict.js
-/**
- * SQL-STRICT context patterns.
- *
- * Extends the base 'SQL' context with three additional rules that are
- * effective at detecting real injections but carry a higher false-positive
- * risk on general free-text input.
- *
- * Use 'SQL-STRICT' when:
- *   - The string is specifically a SQL fragment or database identifier
- *   - You control the input domain (e.g. a dedicated SQL search field)
- *   - You can tolerate occasional false positives in exchange for broader coverage
- *
- * Use 'SQL' (not STRICT) when:
- *   - The field is general user text (names, descriptions, comments)
- *   - False positives would block legitimate content (e.g. "see note -- above")
- *
- * Rules moved here from 'SQL' due to false-positive risk:
- *
- *   sql-line-comment   — "--" fires on "see note -- above", "value--", CSS var(--primary)
- *   sql-stacked-query  — "; SELECT" fires on legitimate prose with semicolons + SQL words
- *   sql-hex-encoding   — "0xDEAD" fires on hex values in technical docs and log output
- */
-
-
-
-const SQL_STRICT_EXTRA = [
-  {
-    id: 'sql-line-comment',
-    description: 'SQL line comment: -- followed by whitespace or end of string',
-    pattern: /--(?:\s|$)/,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-stacked-query',
-    description: 'Stacked queries: semicolon immediately followed by a SQL keyword',
-    pattern: /;\s{0,10}(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|CREATE|ALTER|EXEC)\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-hex-encoding',
-    description: 'Hex-encoded string injection: 0x41414141 style (MySQL)',
-    pattern: /\b0x[0-9a-f]{4,}/i,
-  },
-];
-
-// SQL-STRICT = all base SQL rules + the three noisy extras
-const SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS = [...sql, ...SQL_STRICT_EXTRA];
-
-/* harmony default export */ const sql_strict = (SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS);
-
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/shell.js
 /**
  * SHELL context patterns.
@@ -58345,20 +59121,22 @@ const LOG_PATTERNS = [
 
 /* harmony default export */ const contexts_log = (LOG_PATTERNS);
 
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/registry.js
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/index.js
 /**
- * Context registry — maps context name strings to their pattern arrays.
+ * is-unsafe v2
  *
- * Adding a new context: create a file in ./contexts/, export a default array
- * of pattern objects, and register it here.
+ * Zero-dependency, DOM-free, pure predicate for detecting unsafe strings
+ * across HTML, XML, SVG, SQL, SQL-STRICT, SHELL, REDOS, NOSQL, and LOG contexts.
  *
- * Context name guide:
- *   SQL        — high-precision rules; safe for general text fields
- *   SQL-STRICT — SQL + three noisier rules (line comments, stacked queries, hex);
- *                use only for SQL-specific inputs
- *   REDOS      — detects ReDoS-prone patterns when string will be compiled as RegExp
+ * v2 change: contexts are imported as named pattern arrays rather than resolved
+ * via a string-keyed registry. This makes each context independently
+ * tree-shakeable — bundlers can drop any context you never import.
+ *
+ * @module is-unsafe
  */
 
+// ─── Context pattern arrays (named exports) ────────────────────────────────
+// Import only the ones you need. Each is independently tree-shakeable.
 
 
 
@@ -58369,8 +59147,40 @@ const LOG_PATTERNS = [
 
 
 
-/** @type {Record<string, Array<{id: string, description: string, pattern: RegExp}>>} */
-const registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY = {
+// SQL-STRICT needs a quoted identifier because of the hyphen
+
+
+
+// ─── VALID_CONTEXTS convenience re-export ─────────────────────────────────
+// Importing this pulls in ALL contexts. Use it only when you need all of them
+// (e.g. for validation UI, tooling, or exhaustive audits).
+// If you only need a subset, import the named contexts directly instead.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+// ─── Attach labels to named contexts ──────────────────────────────────────
+// Each built-in PatternList carries its canonical name so matchList can read
+// list.label directly — no registry lookup needed at match time.
+// Custom PatternLists default to 'CUSTOM' unless the caller sets list.label.
+
+html.label       = 'HTML';
+xml.label        = 'XML';
+svg.label        = 'SVG';
+sql.label        = 'SQL';
+sql_strict.label = 'SQL-STRICT';
+shell.label      = 'SHELL';
+redos.label      = 'REDOS';
+nosql.label      = 'NOSQL';
+contexts_log.label        = 'LOG';
+
+const VALID_CONTEXTS = Object.freeze({
   HTML: html,
   XML: xml,
   SVG: svg,
@@ -58380,45 +59190,29 @@ const registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY = {
   REDOS: redos,
   NOSQL: nosql,
   LOG: contexts_log,
-};
+});
 
-/* harmony default export */ const registry = (registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY);
+// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /**
- * Enum of valid context names — e.g. `VALID_CONTEXTS.HTML === 'HTML'`.
- * @type {Record<string, string>}
- */
-const VALID_CONTEXTS = Object.freeze(
-  Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY).map((k) => [k, k]))
-);
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/index.js
-/**
- * is-unsafe
- *
- * Zero-dependency, DOM-free, pure predicate for detecting unsafe strings
- * across HTML, XML, SVG, SQL, SQL-STRICT, SHELL, REDOS, NOSQL, and LOG contexts.
- *
- * @module is-unsafe
+ * @typedef {{ id: string, description: string, pattern: RegExp }} Rule
  */
 
-
-
 /**
- * @typedef {'HTML'|'XML'|'SVG'|'SQL'|'SQL-STRICT'|'SHELL'|'REDOS'|'NOSQL'|'LOG'} ContextName
+ * @typedef {Rule[]} PatternList
  */
 
 /**
  * @typedef {Object} MatchResult
- * @property {string} context   - The context in which the match was found
- * @property {string} id        - Rule identifier
+ * @property {string} context     - Label identifying which context matched ('HTML', 'CUSTOM', etc.)
+ * @property {string} id          - Rule identifier
  * @property {string} description - Human-readable description of what was matched
- * @property {RegExp} pattern   - The pattern that matched
+ * @property {RegExp} pattern     - The pattern that matched
  */
 
-// ─── Validation helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// ─── Internal helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /**
- * Validate that `value` is a string. Throws TypeError if not.
  * @param {unknown} value
  */
 function assertString(value) {
@@ -58430,56 +59224,61 @@ function assertString(value) {
 }
 
 /**
- * Validate that `context` is a recognised context name, an array of them,
- * or a RegExp instance. Throws TypeError if not.
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
+ * @param {unknown} context
  */
 function assertContext(context) {
   if (context instanceof RegExp) return;
 
-  if (typeof context === 'string') {
-    if (!registry[context]) {
-      throw new TypeError(
-        `is-unsafe: unknown context "${context}". Valid contexts: ${Object.keys(VALID_CONTEXTS).join(', ')}`
-      );
-    }
-    return;
-  }
-
   if (Array.isArray(context)) {
     if (context.length === 0) {
-      throw new TypeError('is-unsafe: context array must not be empty');
+      throw new TypeError('is-unsafe: context must not be an empty array');
     }
-    for (const c of context) {
-      if (typeof c !== 'string' || !registry[c]) {
-        throw new TypeError(
-          `is-unsafe: unknown context "${c}" in array. Valid contexts: ${Object.keys(VALID_CONTEXTS).join(', ')}`
-        );
+    // Detect array-of-arrays vs flat pattern list
+    if (Array.isArray(context[0])) {
+      // Array of PatternLists
+      for (const list of context) {
+        if (!Array.isArray(list) || list.length === 0) {
+          throw new TypeError(
+            'is-unsafe: each context in the array must be a non-empty pattern array (PatternList)'
+          );
+        }
       }
     }
+    // else: flat PatternList — trust it, no deep validation needed
     return;
   }
 
   throw new TypeError(
-    `is-unsafe: second argument must be a context string, array of context strings, or RegExp. Got: ${typeof context}`
+    `is-unsafe: second argument must be a PatternList (e.g. HTML), ` +
+    `an array of PatternLists (e.g. [HTML, XML]), or a RegExp. Got: ${typeof context}`
   );
 }
 
-// ─── Core matching logic ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Normalise any valid context arg into an array of PatternLists.
+ *
+ * @param {Rule[]|Rule[][]|RegExp} context
+ * @returns {{ lists: Rule[][]|null, regex: RegExp|null }}
+ */
+function normalise(context) {
+  if (context instanceof RegExp) return { lists: null, regex: context };
+  // Distinguish PatternList (array of rule objects) from array of PatternLists
+  if (Array.isArray(context[0])) return { lists: context, regex: null };
+  return { lists: [context], regex: null };
+}
 
 /**
- * Test a single value against one named context's patterns.
- * Returns the first matching MatchResult, or null if nothing matched.
+ * Test value against a single PatternList. Returns the first MatchResult or null.
  *
  * @param {string} value
- * @param {string} contextName
+ * @param {Rule[]} list
  * @returns {MatchResult|null}
  */
-function matchContext(value, contextName) {
-  const patterns = registry[contextName];
-  for (const rule of patterns) {
+function matchList(value, list) {
+  const label = list.label ?? 'CUSTOM';
+  for (const rule of list) {
     if (rule.pattern.test(value)) {
-      return { context: contextName, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern };
+      return { context: label, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern };
     }
   }
   return null;
@@ -58490,103 +59289,95 @@ function matchContext(value, contextName) {
 /**
  * Returns `true` if `value` is unsafe in the given context(s), `false` otherwise.
  *
- * @param {string} value           - The string to test
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
- *   - A named context ('HTML', 'XML', 'SVG', 'SQL', 'SQL-STRICT', 'SHELL', 'REDOS', 'NOSQL', 'LOG')
- *   - An array of named contexts — returns true if unsafe in **any** of them
+ * @param {string} value - The string to test
+ * @param {PatternList | PatternList[] | RegExp} context
+ *   - A PatternList imported from is-unsafe (e.g. `HTML`, `XML`)
+ *   - An array of PatternLists — returns true if unsafe in **any** of them
  *   - A custom RegExp — returns true if the pattern matches
  * @returns {boolean}
  *
  * @example
- * isUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', 'HTML')  // true
- * isUnsafe('hello world', 'HTML')                // false
- * isUnsafe('value', ['HTML', 'SQL'])             // false
- * isUnsafe('value', /my-pattern/i)               // false
+ * import { isUnsafe, HTML, SQL } from 'is-unsafe';
+ *
+ * isUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', HTML)       // true
+ * isUnsafe('hello world', HTML)                     // false
+ * isUnsafe('value', [HTML, SQL])                    // false
+ * isUnsafe('value', /my-pattern/i)                  // false
  */
 function isUnsafe(value, context) {
   assertString(value);
   assertContext(context);
 
-  // Custom RegExp — caller-supplied pattern
-  if (context instanceof RegExp) {
-    return context.test(value);
-  }
+  const { lists, regex } = normalise(context);
 
-  // Single named context
-  if (typeof context === 'string') {
-    return matchContext(value, context) !== null;
-  }
+  if (regex) return regex.test(value);
 
-  // Array of named contexts — unsafe if ANY context matches
-  for (const c of context) {
-    if (matchContext(value, c) !== null) return true;
+  for (const list of lists) {
+    if (matchList(value, list) !== null) return true;
   }
   return false;
 }
 
 /**
- * Like `isUnsafe`, but instead of a boolean returns the first `MatchResult`
- * describing **why** the value was flagged, or `null` if it is safe.
- *
- * Useful for logging, error messages, or policy reporting.
+ * Like `isUnsafe`, but returns the first `MatchResult` describing **why**
+ * the value was flagged, or `null` if it is safe.
  *
  * @param {string} value
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
+ * @param {PatternList | PatternList[] | RegExp} context
  * @returns {MatchResult|null}
  *
  * @example
- * whyUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', 'HTML')
+ * import { whyUnsafe, HTML } from 'is-unsafe';
+ *
+ * whyUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', HTML)
  * // { context: 'HTML', id: 'html-script-open', description: '...', pattern: /.../ }
  */
 function whyUnsafe(value, context) {
   assertString(value);
   assertContext(context);
 
-  if (context instanceof RegExp) {
-    return context.test(value)
-      ? { context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: context }
+  const { lists, regex } = normalise(context);
+
+  if (regex) {
+    return regex.test(value)
+      ? { context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: regex }
       : null;
   }
 
-  if (typeof context === 'string') {
-    return matchContext(value, context);
-  }
-
-  for (const c of context) {
-    const result = matchContext(value, c);
+  for (const list of lists) {
+    const result = matchList(value, list);
     if (result !== null) return result;
   }
   return null;
 }
 
 /**
- * Returns all matching rules across the given context(s), or an empty array
- * if the value is safe. Useful for comprehensive auditing.
+ * Returns **all** matching rules across the given context(s), or an empty
+ * array if the value is safe. Useful for comprehensive auditing.
  *
  * @param {string} value
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
+ * @param {PatternList | PatternList[] | RegExp} context
  * @returns {MatchResult[]}
  */
 function allUnsafe(value, context) {
   assertString(value);
   assertContext(context);
 
+  const { lists, regex } = normalise(context);
   const results = [];
 
-  if (context instanceof RegExp) {
-    if (context.test(value)) {
-      results.push({ context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: context });
+  if (regex) {
+    if (regex.test(value)) {
+      results.push({ context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: regex });
     }
     return results;
   }
 
-  const contexts = typeof context === 'string' ? [context] : context;
-
-  for (const c of contexts) {
-    const patterns = CONTEXT_REGISTRY[c];
-    for (const rule of patterns) {
+  for (const list of lists) {
+    const label = list.label ?? 'CUSTOM';
+    for (const rule of list) {
       if (rule.pattern.test(value)) {
-        results.push({ context: c, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern });
+        results.push({ context: label, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern });
       }
     }
   }
@@ -58596,6 +59387,7 @@ function allUnsafe(value, context) {
 
 
 /* harmony default export */ const src = ((/* unused pure expression or super */ null && (isUnsafe)));
+
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/fast-xml-parser/src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js
 
 ///@ts-check
@@ -58686,6 +59478,7 @@ class OrderedObjParser {
     this.ignoreAttributesFn = ignoreAttributes_getIgnoreAttributesFn(this.options.ignoreAttributes)
     this.entityExpansionCount = 0;
     this.currentExpandedLength = 0;
+    this.doctypefound = false;
     let namedEntities = { ...XML };
     if (this.options.entityDecoder) {
       this.entityDecoder = this.options.entityDecoder
@@ -58703,8 +59496,7 @@ class OrderedObjParser {
         // onExternalEntity: (name, value) => isUnsafe(value) ? 'block' : 'allow',
         onInputEntity: (name, value) =>
           //TODO: VALID_CONTEXTS.HTML should be set only if this.options.htmlEntities
-          isUnsafe(value, [VALID_CONTEXTS.HTML, VALID_CONTEXTS.XML])
-            ? ENTITY_ACTION.BLOCK : ENTITY_ACTION.ALLOW,
+          isUnsafe(value, [html, xml]) ? ENTITY_ACTION.BLOCK : ENTITY_ACTION.ALLOW,
 
         //postCheck: resolved => resolved
       });
@@ -58894,6 +59686,7 @@ const parseXml = function (xmlData) {
   // Reset entity expansion counters for this document
   this.entityExpansionCount = 0;
   this.currentExpandedLength = 0;
+  this.doctypefound = false;
   const options = this.options;
   const docTypeReader = new DocTypeReader(options.processEntities);
   const xmlLen = xmlData.length;
@@ -58978,6 +59771,8 @@ const parseXml = function (xmlData) {
         i = endIndex;
       } else if (c1 === 33
         && xmlData.charCodeAt(i + 2) === 68) { //'!D'
+        if (this.doctypefound) throw new Error("Multiple DOCTYPE declarations found.");
+        this.doctypefound = true;
         const result = docTypeReader.readDocType(xmlData, i);
         this.entityDecoder.addInputEntities(result.entities);
         i = result.i;
diff --git a/dist/setup/index.js b/dist/setup/index.js
index 14d6048..56b1747 100644
--- a/dist/setup/index.js
+++ b/dist/setup/index.js
@@ -9897,6 +9897,20 @@ var escClose = '\0CLOSE'+Math.random()+'\0';
 var escComma = '\0COMMA'+Math.random()+'\0';
 var escPeriod = '\0PERIOD'+Math.random()+'\0';
 
+var EXPANSION_MAX = 100000
+
+// `EXPANSION_MAX` caps the *number* of expansions, but not their length. An
+// input like `'{a,b}'.repeat(1500)` stays under that count - its output is
+// truncated to 100k results - while making every result ~1500 characters
+// long. The result set, and the intermediate arrays built while combining
+// brace sets, then grow large enough to exhaust memory and crash the process
+// (CVE-2026-14257). `EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH` bounds the total number of
+// characters the accumulator may hold at any point, so memory stays flat no
+// matter how many brace groups are chained. The limit sits well above any
+// realistic expansion (100k results hitting `EXPANSION_MAX` measure ~1M
+// characters) so legitimate input is unaffected.
+var EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH = 4000000
+
 function numeric(str) {
   return parseInt(str, 10) == str
     ? parseInt(str, 10)
@@ -9955,7 +9969,8 @@ function expandTop(str, options) {
     return [];
 
   options = options || {};
-  var max = options.max == null ? Infinity : options.max;
+  var max = options.max == null ? EXPANSION_MAX : options.max;
+  var maxLength = options.maxLength == null ? EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH : options.maxLength;
 
   // I don't know why Bash 4.3 does this, but it does.
   // Anything starting with {} will have the first two bytes preserved
@@ -9967,7 +9982,7 @@ function expandTop(str, options) {
     str = '\\{\\}' + str.substr(2);
   }
 
-  return expand(escapeBraces(str), max, true).map(unescapeBraces);
+  return expand(escapeBraces(str), max, maxLength, true).map(unescapeBraces);
 }
 
 function identity(e) {
@@ -9988,106 +10003,270 @@ function gte(i, y) {
   return i >= y;
 }
 
-function expand(str, max, isTop) {
-  var expansions = [];
-
-  var m = balanced('{', '}', str);
-  if (!m || /\$$/.test(m.pre)) return [str];
-
-  var isNumericSequence = /^-?\d+\.\.-?\d+(?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
-  var isAlphaSequence = /^[a-zA-Z]\.\.[a-zA-Z](?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
-  var isSequence = isNumericSequence || isAlphaSequence;
-  var isOptions = m.body.indexOf(',') >= 0;
-  if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
-    // {a},b}
-    if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
-      str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
-      return expand(str, max, true);
+// Build `{ acc[a] + pre + values[v] }` for every combination, capping the
+// number of results at `max` and the total number of characters at `maxLength`.
+// This is the one place output grows, so bounding it here keeps the single
+// accumulator - and therefore memory - flat regardless of how many brace groups
+// are combined (CVE-2026-14257).
+//
+// `base[a]` is the length of the part of `acc[a]` that predates the current
+// empty-drop baseline (see `expand`). The matching baselines for the results
+// are appended to `outBase`, which the caller carries forward alongside them.
+function combine(
+  acc,
+  base,
+  pre,
+  values,
+  max,
+  maxLength,
+  dropEmpties,
+  outBase
+) {
+  var out = []
+  var length = 0
+  for (var a = 0; a < acc.length; a++) {
+    for (var v = 0; v < values.length; v++) {
+      if (out.length >= max) return out
+      var expansion = acc[a] + pre + values[v]
+      // Bash drops empty results at the top level. Skip them before they count
+      // against `max`, so `max` bounds the number of *kept* results. "Empty"
+      // means "adds nothing past the baseline", not "empty overall".
+      if (dropEmpties && expansion.length === base[a]) continue
+      if (length + expansion.length > maxLength) return out
+      out.push(expansion)
+      outBase.push(base[a])
+      length += expansion.length
     }
-    return [str];
   }
+  return out
+}
 
-  var n;
-  if (isSequence) {
-    n = m.body.split(/\.\./);
-  } else {
-    n = parseCommaParts(m.body);
-    if (n.length === 1) {
-      // x{{a,b}}y ==> x{a}y x{b}y
-      n = expand(n[0], max, false).map(embrace);
-      if (n.length === 1) {
-        var post = m.post.length
-          ? expand(m.post, max, false)
-          : [''];
-        return post.map(function(p) {
-          return m.pre + n[0] + p;
-        });
+// The expansion values of a single numeric (`1..5`) or alphabetic (`a..e..2`)
+// sequence body.
+function expandSequence(
+  body,
+  isAlphaSequence,
+  max,
+  maxLength
+) {
+  var n = body.split(/\.\./)
+  var N = []
+  // A sequence body always splits into two or three parts, but the compiler
+  // can't know that.
+  /* c8 ignore start */
+  if (n[0] === undefined || n[1] === undefined) {
+    return N
+  }
+  /* c8 ignore stop */
+  var x = numeric(n[0])
+  var y = numeric(n[1])
+  var width = Math.max(n[0].length, n[1].length)
+  var incr =
+    n.length === 3 && n[2] !== undefined ?
+      Math.max(Math.abs(numeric(n[2])), 1)
+    : 1
+  var test = lte
+  var reverse = y < x
+  if (reverse) {
+    incr *= -1
+    test = gte
+  }
+  var pad = n.some(isPadded)
+
+  var length = 0
+  for (var i = x; test(i, y) && N.length < max; i += incr) {
+    var c
+    if (isAlphaSequence) {
+      c = String.fromCharCode(i)
+      if (c === '\\') {
+        c = ''
       }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // at this point, n is the parts, and we know it's not a comma set
-  // with a single entry.
-
-  // no need to expand pre, since it is guaranteed to be free of brace-sets
-  var pre = m.pre;
-  var post = m.post.length
-    ? expand(m.post, max, false)
-    : [''];
-
-  var N;
-
-  if (isSequence) {
-    var x = numeric(n[0]);
-    var y = numeric(n[1]);
-    var width = Math.max(n[0].length, n[1].length)
-    var incr = n.length == 3
-      ? Math.max(Math.abs(numeric(n[2])), 1)
-      : 1;
-    var test = lte;
-    var reverse = y < x;
-    if (reverse) {
-      incr *= -1;
-      test = gte;
-    }
-    var pad = n.some(isPadded);
-
-    N = [];
-
-    for (var i = x; test(i, y) && N.length < max; i += incr) {
-      var c;
-      if (isAlphaSequence) {
-        c = String.fromCharCode(i);
-        if (c === '\\')
-          c = '';
-      } else {
-        c = String(i);
-        if (pad) {
-          var need = width - c.length;
-          if (need > 0) {
-            var z = new Array(need + 1).join('0');
-            if (i < 0)
-              c = '-' + z + c.slice(1);
-            else
-              c = z + c;
+    } else {
+      c = String(i)
+      if (pad) {
+        var need = width - c.length
+        if (need > 0) {
+          var z = new Array(need + 1).join('0')
+          if (i < 0) {
+            c = '-' + z + c.slice(1)
+          } else {
+            c = z + c
           }
         }
       }
-      N.push(c);
     }
-  } else {
-    N = concatMap(n, function(el) { return expand(el, max, false) });
+    if (length + c.length > maxLength) break
+    N.push(c)
+    length += c.length
+  }
+  return N
+}
+
+function expand(
+  str,
+  max,
+  maxLength,
+  isTop
+) {
+  // Consume the string's top-level brace groups left to right, threading a
+  // running set of combined prefixes (`acc`). Expanding the tail iteratively -
+  // rather than recursing on `m.post` once per group - keeps the native stack
+  // depth constant, so deeply chained input (`'{a,b}'.repeat(3000)`) can no
+  // longer overflow the stack, and leaves a single accumulator whose size
+  // `maxLength` bounds directly (CVE-2026-14257).
+  var acc = ['']
+
+  // Bash drops empty results, but only when the *first* group of the run is a
+  // comma set - a sequence like `{a..\}` may legitimately yield ''. The drop
+  // is on the final strings, so it is applied to whichever `combine` produces
+  // them (the one with no brace set left in the tail).
+  //
+  // The old implementation recursed on `m.post`, so the drop tested only the
+  // expansion of the current call's substring. The `{a},b}` rewrite below turns
+  // `isTop` back on part-way through a string, starting a fresh such run, so
+  // the drop must ignore whatever `acc` already holds from earlier groups.
+  // `accBase[a]` records how much of `acc[a]` predates the current run;
+  // `combine` treats an expansion as empty when it adds nothing past that.
+  var accBase = [0]
+  var dropEmpties = false
+  var firstGroup = true
+  var nextBase
+
+  for (;;) {
+    var m = balanced('{', '}', str);
+
+    // No brace set left: the rest of the string is literal.
+    if (!m) {
+      return combine(acc, accBase, str, [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties, [])
+    }
+
+    // no need to expand pre, since it is guaranteed to be free of brace-sets
+    var pre = m.pre;
+
+    // For compatibility reasons, `${` is not eligible for brace expansion, and
+    // on the 1.x line it suppresses expansion of the rest of the string too:
+    // the whole remainder is literal. The 2.x and 5.x lines instead keep
+    // expanding the tail, which is what bash does, but changing that here would
+    // be a breaking change for 1.x consumers. Routed through `combine` so the
+    // result is still bounded by `max` and `maxLength`.
+    if (/\$$/.test(pre)) {
+      return combine(acc, accBase, str, [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties, [])
+    }
+
+    var isNumericSequence = /^-?\d+\.\.-?\d+(?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
+    var isAlphaSequence = /^[a-zA-Z]\.\.[a-zA-Z](?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
+    var isSequence = isNumericSequence || isAlphaSequence;
+    var isOptions = m.body.indexOf(',') >= 0;
+    if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
+      // {a},b}
+      if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
+        str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
+        // The rewritten string is expanded as if it were a fresh top-level one,
+        // so start a new empty-drop run: anchor the baseline at what `acc`
+        // holds now, and let the next expanding group decide whether to drop.
+        isTop = true
+        firstGroup = true
+        dropEmpties = false
+        accBase = []
+        for (var b = 0; b < acc.length; b++) {
+          accBase.push(acc[b].length)
+        }
+        continue
+      }
+      // Nothing here expands, so the whole remaining string is literal.
+      return combine(
+        acc,
+        accBase,
+        pre + '{' + m.body + '}' + m.post,
+        [''],
+        max,
+        maxLength,
+        dropEmpties,
+        []
+      )
+    }
+
+    if (firstGroup) {
+      dropEmpties = isTop && !isSequence
+      firstGroup = false
+    }
+
+    var values;
+    if (isSequence) {
+      values = expandSequence(m.body, isAlphaSequence, max, maxLength);
+    } else {
+      var n = parseCommaParts(m.body);
+      if (n.length === 1 && n[0] !== undefined) {
+        // x{{a,b}}y ==> x{a}y x{b}y
+        n = expand(n[0], max, maxLength, false).map(embrace);
+        //XXX is this necessary? Can't seem to hit it in tests.
+        /* c8 ignore start */
+        if (n.length === 1) {
+          nextBase = []
+          acc = combine(
+            acc,
+            accBase,
+            pre + n[0],
+            [''],
+            max,
+            maxLength,
+            dropEmpties && !m.post.length,
+            nextBase
+          )
+          accBase = nextBase
+          if (!m.post.length) break
+          str = m.post
+          continue
+        }
+        /* c8 ignore stop */
+      }
+
+      // Values that `combine` is going to drop as empty produce no result, so
+      // they must not count against `max` - otherwise `{a,,b}` with `max: 2`
+      // would stop at `['a', '']` and yield one result instead of two. Skipping
+      // them outright keeps `values` bounded while leaving `max` a bound on
+      // *kept* results. A value is dropped when it adds nothing past the
+      // baseline, which is what `combine` tests.
+      var dropsEmpties = dropEmpties && !m.post.length && !pre
+      for (var d = 0; dropsEmpties && d < acc.length; d++) {
+        if (acc[d].length !== accBase[d]) {
+          dropsEmpties = false
+        }
+      }
+
+      values = []
+      var valuesLength = 0
+      outer: for (var j = 0; j < n.length; j++) {
+        var expanded = expand(n[j], max, maxLength, false)
+        for (var k = 0; k < expanded.length; k++) {
+          var v = expanded[k]
+          if (dropsEmpties && !v) continue
+          if (values.length >= max || valuesLength + v.length > maxLength) {
+            break outer
+          }
+          values.push(v)
+          valuesLength += v.length
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    nextBase = []
+    acc = combine(
+      acc,
+      accBase,
+      pre,
+      values,
+      max,
+      maxLength,
+      dropEmpties && !m.post.length,
+      nextBase
+    )
+    accBase = nextBase
+    if (!m.post.length) break
+    str = m.post
   }
 
-  for (var j = 0; j < N.length; j++) {
-    for (var k = 0; k < post.length && expansions.length < max; k++) {
-      var expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k];
-      if (!isTop || isSequence || expansion)
-        expansions.push(expansion);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return expansions;
+  return acc
 }
 
 
@@ -16497,7 +16676,13 @@ function processHeader (request, key, val) {
       } else if (typeof val[i] === 'object') {
         throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)
       } else {
-        arr.push(`${val[i]}`)
+        // Coerce primitives (and reject unsafe coercions such as functions
+        // with a crafted toString/Symbol.toPrimitive).
+        const str = `${val[i]}`
+        if (!isValidHeaderValue(str)) {
+          throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)
+        }
+        arr.push(str)
       }
     }
     val = arr
@@ -16508,7 +16693,12 @@ function processHeader (request, key, val) {
   } else if (val === null) {
     val = ''
   } else {
+    // Coerce primitives (and reject unsafe coercions such as functions
+    // with a crafted toString/Symbol.toPrimitive).
     val = `${val}`
+    if (!isValidHeaderValue(val)) {
+      throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)
+    }
   }
 
   if (headerName === 'host') {
@@ -17880,6 +18070,7 @@ const {
   RequestContentLengthMismatchError,
   ResponseContentLengthMismatchError,
   RequestAbortedError,
+  InvalidArgumentError,
   HeadersTimeoutError,
   HeadersOverflowError,
   SocketError,
@@ -18863,8 +19054,16 @@ function writeH1 (client, request) {
     }
     body = bodyStream.stream
     contentLength = bodyStream.length
-  } else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null && body.type) {
-    headers.push('content-type', body.type)
+  } else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null) {
+    const contentType = body.type
+    if (contentType) {
+      const contentTypeValue = `${contentType}`
+      if (!util.isValidHeaderValue(contentTypeValue)) {
+        util.errorRequest(client, request, new InvalidArgumentError('invalid content-type header'))
+        return false
+      }
+      headers.push('content-type', contentTypeValue)
+    }
   }
 
   if (body && typeof body.read === 'function') {
@@ -22337,6 +22536,28 @@ function calculateRetryAfterHeader (retryAfter) {
   return new Date(retryAfter).getTime() - current
 }
 
+function validatePartialResponseContentLength (headers, range, statusCode, retryCount) {
+  const contentLength = headers['content-length']
+  if (contentLength == null) {
+    return null
+  }
+
+  if (!Number.isFinite(range.start) || !Number.isFinite(range.end)) {
+    return null
+  }
+
+  const length = Number(contentLength)
+  const expectedLength = range.end - range.start + 1
+  if (!Number.isFinite(length) || length !== expectedLength) {
+    return new RequestRetryError('Content-Length mismatch', statusCode, {
+      headers,
+      data: { count: retryCount }
+    })
+  }
+
+  return null
+}
+
 class RetryHandler {
   constructor (opts, handlers) {
     const { retryOptions, ...dispatchOpts } = opts
@@ -22551,6 +22772,12 @@ class RetryHandler {
         return false
       }
 
+      const contentLengthError = validatePartialResponseContentLength(headers, contentRange, statusCode, this.retryCount)
+      if (contentLengthError != null) {
+        this.abort(contentLengthError)
+        return false
+      }
+
       const { start, size, end = size - 1 } = contentRange
 
       assert(this.start === start, 'content-range mismatch')
@@ -22574,6 +22801,12 @@ class RetryHandler {
           )
         }
 
+        const contentLengthError = validatePartialResponseContentLength(headers, range, statusCode, this.retryCount)
+        if (contentLengthError != null) {
+          this.abort(contentLengthError)
+          return false
+        }
+
         const { start, size, end = size - 1 } = range
         assert(
           start != null && Number.isFinite(start),
@@ -26818,7 +27051,7 @@ function validateCookiePath (path) {
 
     if (
       code < 0x20 || // exclude CTLs (0-31)
-      code === 0x7F || // DEL
+      code > 0x7E || // exclude DEL and non-ascii
       code === 0x3B // ;
     ) {
       throw new Error('Invalid cookie path')
@@ -26827,16 +27060,80 @@ function validateCookiePath (path) {
 }
 
 /**
- * I have no idea why these values aren't allowed to be honest,
- * but Deno tests these. - Khafra
+ * <let-dig> ::= <letter> | <digit>
+ *
+ * <letter> ::= any one of the 52 alphabetic characters A through Z in
+ * upper case and a through z in lower case
+ *
+ * <digit> ::= any one of the ten digits 0 through 9r
+ *
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034#section-3.5
+ * @param {number} code
+ */
+function isLetterOrDigit (code) {
+  return (
+    (code >= 0x30 && code <= 0x39) || // 0-9
+    (code >= 0x41 && code <= 0x5A) || // A-Z
+    (code >= 0x61 && code <= 0x7A) // a-z
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates a cookie domain against the "preferred name syntax".
+ *
+ * <domain>      ::= <subdomain> | " "
+ * <subdomain>   ::= <label> | <subdomain> "." <label>
+ * <label>       ::= <let-dig> [ [ <ldh-str> ] <let-dig> ]
+ * <ldh-str>     ::= <let-dig-hyp> | <let-dig-hyp> <ldh-str>
+ * <let-dig-hyp> ::= <let-dig> | "-"
+ *
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034#section-3.5
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1123#section-2.1
+ * @see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035#section-2.3.4
  * @param {string} domain
  */
 function validateCookieDomain (domain) {
-  if (
-    domain.startsWith('-') ||
-    domain.endsWith('.') ||
-    domain.endsWith('-')
-  ) {
+  // <domain> ::= <subdomain> | " "
+  if (domain === ' ') {
+    return
+  }
+
+  if (domain.length > 255) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+  }
+
+  let labelLength = 0
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < domain.length; ++i) {
+    const code = domain.charCodeAt(i)
+
+    if (code === 0x2E) {
+      if (labelLength === 0) {
+        throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+      }
+
+      if (domain.charCodeAt(i - 1) === 0x2D) { // "-"
+        throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+      }
+
+      labelLength = 0
+      continue
+    }
+
+    if (labelLength === 0 && !isLetterOrDigit(code)) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+    }
+
+    if (!isLetterOrDigit(code) && code !== 0x2D) { // "-"
+      throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+    }
+
+    if (++labelLength > 63) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (labelLength === 0 || domain.charCodeAt(domain.length - 1) === 0x2D) { // "-"
     throw new Error('Invalid cookie domain')
   }
 }
@@ -26979,7 +27276,13 @@ function stringify (cookie) {
 
     const [key, ...value] = part.split('=')
 
-    out.push(`${key.trim()}=${value.join('=')}`)
+    const trimmedKey = key.trim()
+    const joinedValue = value.join('=')
+
+    validateCookieName(trimmedKey)
+    validateCookieValue(joinedValue)
+
+    out.push(`${trimmedKey}=${joinedValue}`)
   }
 
   return out.join('; ')
@@ -49709,7 +50012,7 @@ class XmlNode {
   }
 }
 
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/xml-naming/src/index.js
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/fast-xml-parser/node_modules/xml-naming/src/index.js
 /**
  * xml-naming
  * Validates XML Name productions as defined in the XML 1.0 and 1.1 specifications.
@@ -49822,8 +50125,36 @@ const buildRegexes = (startChar, char, flags = '') => {
 const regexes10 = buildRegexes(nameStartChar10, nameChar10);       // no /u — BMP only
 const regexes11 = buildRegexes(nameStartChar11, nameChar11, 'u');  // /u — enables \u{10000}-\u{EFFFF}
 
-const getRegexes = (xmlVersion = '1.0') =>
-  xmlVersion === '1.1' ? regexes11 : regexes10;
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// ASCII-only fast path (opt-in, off by default)
+//
+// The XML 1.0 vs 1.1 NameStartChar/NameChar productions differ *only* in
+// their non-ASCII ranges (merged vs split Latin-1 ranges, \u0487, and
+// supplementary planes). Restricted to ASCII, both versions collapse to the
+// same character classes, so a single regex pair covers both xmlVersion
+// values — no /u flag needed.
+//
+// Rationale: unicode-aware regexes (the /u flag, required for XML 1.1's
+// supplementary-plane range) are measurably slower in V8 than plain
+// non-unicode regexes on the same input, even when the input is pure ASCII.
+// For the common case — HTML/SVG ids, XML tags — names are ASCII, so callers
+// who know this can opt in to skip the unicode-aware matching path entirely.
+// This is a real but *conditional* win: mainly for XML 1.1 input (avoids /u),
+// or at scale where the larger unicode character classes add engine
+// overhead. It also changes behaviour (rejects legitimate non-ASCII XML
+// 1.0/1.1 names), so it must never be silently enabled — hence off by
+// default.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const nameStartCharAscii = ':A-Za-z_';
+const nameCharAscii = nameStartCharAscii + '\\-\\.\\d';
+
+const regexesAscii = buildRegexes(nameStartCharAscii, nameCharAscii); // no /u — ASCII only
+
+const getRegexes = (xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false) => {
+  if (asciiOnly) return regexesAscii;
+  return xmlVersion === '1.1' ? regexes11 : regexes10;
+};
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Boolean validators
@@ -49833,57 +50164,131 @@ const getRegexes = (xmlVersion = '1.0') =>
  * Returns true if the string is a valid XML Name.
  * Colons are allowed anywhere (Name production).
  * Used for: DOCTYPE entity names, notation names, DTD element declarations.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
  */
-const src_name = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
-  getRegexes(xmlVersion).name.test(str);
+const src_name = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).name.test(str);
 
 /**
  * Returns true if the string is a valid NCName (Non-Colonized Name).
  * Colons are not permitted.
  * Used for: namespace prefixes, local names, SVG id attributes.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
  */
-const ncName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
-  getRegexes(xmlVersion).ncName.test(str);
+const ncName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).ncName.test(str);
 
 /**
  * Returns true if the string is a valid QName (Qualified Name).
  * Allows exactly one colon as a prefix separator: prefix:localName.
  * Used for: element and attribute names in namespace-aware XML/SVG.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
  */
-const qName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
-  getRegexes(xmlVersion).qName.test(str);
+const qName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).qName.test(str);
 
 /**
  * Returns true if the string is a valid NMToken.
  * Like Name but no restriction on the first character.
  * Used for: DTD NMTOKEN attribute values.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
  */
-const nmToken = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
-  getRegexes(xmlVersion).nmToken.test(str);
+const nmToken = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).nmToken.test(str);
 
 /**
  * Returns true if the string is a valid NMTokens value.
  * A whitespace-separated list of NMToken values.
  * Used for: DTD NMTOKENS attribute values.
+ *
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: skip unicode-aware matching, ASCII names only (default false).
  */
-const nmTokens = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
-  getRegexes(xmlVersion).nmTokens.test(str);
+const nmTokens = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) =>
+  getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly).nmTokens.test(str);
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Memoized validator factory
+//
+// Real documents reuse a small vocabulary of tag/attribute names across many
+// siblings (e.g. `id`, `class`, `href` repeated across hundreds of elements).
+// The plain boolean validators above re-run the regex on every call
+// regardless of repeats. `createValidator` returns a closure with a private
+// string -> boolean cache, so repeated names after the first become O(1)
+// lookups instead of regex tests.
+//
+// - opts (xmlVersion, asciiOnly) are fixed at creation time, so the regex is
+//   resolved once, not on every call.
+// - The cache is private to the returned closure — no shared/global state,
+//   no cross-caller pollution.
+// - `maxCacheSize` bounds memory: once the cache reaches this many entries,
+//   it stops accepting new ones (existing entries keep serving hits; new
+//   misses just fall through to the regex, uncached). This avoids unbounded
+//   growth against adversarial/high-cardinality input (e.g. validating
+//   attacker-supplied names with no repeats) without the cost/complexity of
+//   a full LRU, and without the perf cliff of reset-and-refill thrashing.
+// - Call `.reset()` on the returned function to clear the cache manually
+//   (e.g. between unrelated parse calls).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const PRODUCTIONS = (/* unused pure expression or super */ null && (['name', 'ncName', 'qName', 'nmToken', 'nmTokens']));
+
+/**
+ * Returns a memoized boolean validator function for a single production,
+ * with opts fixed at creation time.
+ *
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean, maxCacheSize?: number }} [opts]
+ *   maxCacheSize: max number of distinct strings to cache (default 2048).
+ *   Once reached, new strings are validated but not cached; existing cached
+ *   entries keep being served.
+ * @returns {((str: string) => boolean) & { reset: () => void }}
+ */
+const createValidator = (production, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false, maxCacheSize = 2048 } = {}) => {
+  if (!PRODUCTIONS.includes(production)) {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      `Unknown production "${production}". Must be one of: ${PRODUCTIONS.join(', ')}`
+    );
+  }
+
+  const regex = getRegexes(xmlVersion, asciiOnly)[production];
+  let cache = new Map();
+
+  const validator = (str) => {
+    const cached = cache.get(str);
+    if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
+
+    const result = regex.test(str);
+    if (cache.size < maxCacheSize) cache.set(str, result);
+    return result;
+  };
+
+  validator.reset = () => { cache = new Map(); };
+
+  return validator;
+};
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Diagnostic validator
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-const PRODUCTIONS = (/* unused pure expression or super */ null && (['name', 'ncName', 'qName', 'nmToken', 'nmTokens']));
-
 /**
  * Validates a string against a named production and returns a detailed result.
  *
  * @param {string} str
  * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
- * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1' }} [opts]
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
  * @returns {{ valid: boolean, production: string, input: string, reason?: string, position?: number }}
  */
-const validate = (str, production, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) => {
+const validate = (str, production, { xmlVersion = '1.0', asciiOnly = false } = {}) => {
   if (!PRODUCTIONS.includes(production)) {
     throw new TypeError(
       `Unknown production "${production}". Must be one of: ${PRODUCTIONS.join(', ')}`
@@ -49891,13 +50296,20 @@ const validate = (str, production, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) => {
   }
 
   const validators = { name: src_name, ncName, qName, nmToken, nmTokens };
-  const isValid = validators[production](str, { xmlVersion });
+  const isValid = validators[production](str, { xmlVersion, asciiOnly });
 
   if (isValid) return { valid: true, production, input: str };
 
   let reason = 'Does not match the production rules';
   let position;
 
+  // Diagnostic fallback char checks must mirror the same character set the
+  // boolean validator above used, or the reported reason/position could
+  // contradict the `valid: false` result (e.g. flagging a char as illegal
+  // that the unicode-aware check would have accepted).
+  const startCharPattern = asciiOnly ? /^[:A-Za-z_]/ : /^[:A-Za-z_\u00C0-\uFFFD]/;
+  const namePattern = asciiOnly ? /[\w\-\\.:]/ : /[\w\-\\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/;
+
   if (str.length === 0) {
     reason = 'Input is empty';
   } else if (production === 'ncName' && str.includes(':')) {
@@ -49914,13 +50326,13 @@ const validate = (str, production, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) => {
     position = str.lastIndexOf(':');
   } else if (
     ['name', 'ncName', 'qName'].includes(production) &&
-    !/^[:A-Za-z_\u00C0-\uFFFD]/.test(str[0])
+    !startCharPattern.test(str[0])
   ) {
     reason = `First character "${str[0]}" is not a valid NameStartChar`;
     position = 0;
   } else {
     for (let i = 0; i < str.length; i++) {
-      if (!/[\w\-\\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/.test(str[i])) {
+      if (!namePattern.test(str[i])) {
         reason = `Character "${str[i]}" at position ${i} is not a valid NameChar`;
         position = i;
         break;
@@ -49940,7 +50352,7 @@ const validate = (str, production, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) => {
  *
  * @param {string[]} strings
  * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
- * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1' }} [opts]
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1', asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
  * @returns {Array<{ valid: boolean, production: string, input: string, reason?: string, position?: number }>}
  */
 const validateAll = (strings, production, opts = {}) =>
@@ -49955,10 +50367,12 @@ const validateAll = (strings, production, opts = {}) =>
  *
  * @param {string} str
  * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
- * @param {{ replacement?: string }} [opts]
+ * @param {{ replacement?: string, asciiOnly?: boolean }} [opts]
+ *   asciiOnly: also replace any non-ASCII character, not just XML-illegal
+ *   ones (default false).
  * @returns {string}
  */
-const sanitize = (str, production = 'name', { replacement = '_' } = {}) => {
+const sanitize = (str, production = 'name', { replacement = '_', asciiOnly = false } = {}) => {
   if (!str) return replacement;
 
   let result = str;
@@ -49969,7 +50383,8 @@ const sanitize = (str, production = 'name', { replacement = '_' } = {}) => {
   }
 
   // Replace illegal characters
-  result = result.replace(/[^\w\-\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/g, replacement);
+  const allowedCharPattern = asciiOnly ? /[^\w\-\.:]/g : /[^\w\-\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/g;
+  result = result.replace(allowedCharPattern, replacement);
 
   // Fix invalid start character for Name / NCName / QName
   if (production !== 'nmToken' && production !== 'nmTokens') {
@@ -50916,6 +51331,26 @@ class MatcherView {
     return current.values !== undefined && attrName in current.values;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Get the value of a "kept" attribute from the nearest ancestor (or
+   * current node) that declared it via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {*}
+   */
+  getAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    return this._matcher.getAnyParentAttr(attrName);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check whether any ancestor (or the current node) kept the given
+   * attribute via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  hasAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    return this._matcher.hasAnyParentAttr(attrName);
+  }
+
   /**
    * Get current node's sibling position (child index in parent).
    * @returns {number}
@@ -51024,6 +51459,9 @@ class Matcher {
     // Each siblingStacks entry: Map<tagName, count> tracking occurrences at each level
     this._pathStringCache = null;
     this._view = new MatcherView(this);
+
+    // Kept-attribute stack: only populated when push() is called with options.keep.
+    this._keptAttrs = [];
   }
 
   /**
@@ -51031,8 +51469,10 @@ class Matcher {
    * @param {string} tagName
    * @param {Object|null} [attrValues=null]
    * @param {string|null} [namespace=null]
+   * @param {Object|null} [options=null]
+   * @param {string[]} [options.keep] - Names of attributes (from attrValues)
    */
-  push(tagName, attrValues = null, namespace = null) {
+  push(tagName, attrValues = null, namespace = null, options = null) {
     this._pathStringCache = null;
 
     // Remove values from previous current node (now becoming ancestor)
@@ -51042,26 +51482,29 @@ class Matcher {
 
     // Get or create sibling tracking for current level
     const currentLevel = this.path.length;
-    if (!this.siblingStacks[currentLevel]) {
-      this.siblingStacks[currentLevel] = new Map();
+    let level = this.siblingStacks[currentLevel];
+    if (!level) {
+      // `counts` tells same-name siblings apart (the "counter" — nth <item>
+      // among other <item>s). `total` is every child seen at this level so
+      // far, kept as a running number instead of re-added from `counts` on
+      // every push — a parent with many differently-named children would
+      // otherwise cost more per child the more distinct names it has.
+      level = { counts: new Map(), total: 0 };
+      this.siblingStacks[currentLevel] = level;
     }
 
-    const siblings = this.siblingStacks[currentLevel];
-
     // Create a unique key for sibling tracking that includes namespace
     const siblingKey = namespace ? `${namespace}:${tagName}` : tagName;
 
     // Calculate counter (how many times this tag appeared at this level)
-    const counter = siblings.get(siblingKey) || 0;
+    const counter = level.counts.get(siblingKey) || 0;
 
-    // Calculate position (total children at this level so far)
-    let position = 0;
-    for (const count of siblings.values()) {
-      position += count;
-    }
+    // Position = total children at this level seen before this one.
+    const position = level.total;
 
-    // Update sibling count for this tag
-    siblings.set(siblingKey, counter + 1);
+    // Update sibling count for this tag, and the level's running total.
+    level.counts.set(siblingKey, counter + 1);
+    level.total++;
 
     // Create new node
     const node = {
@@ -51079,6 +51522,24 @@ class Matcher {
     }
 
     this.path.push(node);
+
+    // Depth of the node we just pushed (1-based, matches this.path.length)
+    const depth = this.path.length;
+
+    // Copy only the requested attributes into the kept-attrs stack. This is
+    // the one part of push() whose cost scales with input (O(keep.length))
+    // rather than being O(1) — by design, since the caller is explicitly
+    // opting in for specific attribute names. No options/keep => zero added
+    // cost beyond the two property reads below.
+    const keep = options !== null ? options.keep : null;
+    if (keep !== null && keep !== undefined && keep.length > 0 && attrValues) {
+      for (let i = 0; i < keep.length; i++) {
+        const name = keep[i];
+        if (attrValues[name] !== undefined) {
+          this._keptAttrs.push({ depth, name, value: attrValues[name] });
+        }
+      }
+    }
   }
 
   /**
@@ -51095,6 +51556,18 @@ class Matcher {
       this.siblingStacks.length = this.path.length + 1;
     }
 
+    // Drop any kept attributes that belonged to the popped node (or deeper).
+    // _keptAttrs is depth-ordered (push only ever appends increasing depths),
+    // so this is a backward scan that stops at the first surviving entry —
+    // typically O(1) since kept attrs are rare by design.
+    const poppedDepth = this.path.length + 1;
+    while (
+      this._keptAttrs.length > 0 &&
+      this._keptAttrs[this._keptAttrs.length - 1].depth >= poppedDepth
+    ) {
+      this._keptAttrs.pop();
+    }
+
     return node;
   }
 
@@ -51149,6 +51622,38 @@ class Matcher {
     return current.values !== undefined && attrName in current.values;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Get the value of a "kept" attribute from the nearest ancestor (or
+   * current node) that declared it via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * Unlike getAttrValue(), this works regardless of how deep the path has
+   * gone since the attribute was pushed — but only for attribute names that
+   * were explicitly marked with `keep` at push time. Cost is proportional to
+   * the number of currently-kept attributes (typically 0-3), not path depth.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {*} the value, or undefined if no ancestor kept this attribute
+   */
+  getAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    const kept = this._keptAttrs;
+    for (let i = kept.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+      if (kept[i].name === attrName) return kept[i].value;
+    }
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check whether any ancestor (or the current node) kept the given
+   * attribute via `push(tag, attrs, ns, { keep: [...] })`.
+   * @param {string} attrName
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  hasAnyParentAttr(attrName) {
+    const kept = this._keptAttrs;
+    for (let i = kept.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+      if (kept[i].name === attrName) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+
   /**
    * Get current node's sibling position (child index in parent).
    * @returns {number}
@@ -51225,6 +51730,7 @@ class Matcher {
     this._pathStringCache = null;
     this.path = [];
     this.siblingStacks = [];
+    this._keptAttrs = [];
   }
 
   /**
@@ -51374,7 +51880,8 @@ class Matcher {
   snapshot() {
     return {
       path: this.path.map(node => ({ ...node })),
-      siblingStacks: this.siblingStacks.map(map => new Map(map))
+      siblingStacks: this.siblingStacks.map(level => level ? { counts: new Map(level.counts), total: level.total } : level),
+      keptAttrs: this._keptAttrs.map(entry => ({ ...entry }))
     };
   }
 
@@ -51385,7 +51892,8 @@ class Matcher {
   restore(snapshot) {
     this._pathStringCache = null;
     this.path = snapshot.path.map(node => ({ ...node }));
-    this.siblingStacks = snapshot.siblingStacks.map(map => new Map(map));
+    this.siblingStacks = snapshot.siblingStacks.map(level => level ? { counts: new Map(level.counts), total: level.total } : level);
+    this._keptAttrs = (snapshot.keptAttrs || []).map(entry => ({ ...entry }));
   }
 
   /**
@@ -51408,6 +51916,7 @@ class Matcher {
     return this._view;
   }
 }
+
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/path-expression-matcher/src/Expression.js
 /**
  * Expression - Parses and stores a tag pattern expression
@@ -51678,6 +52187,9 @@ class ExpressionSet {
     /** @type {import('./Expression.js').default[]} expressions containing deep wildcard (..) */
     this._deepWildcards = [];
 
+    /** @type {Map<string, import('./Expression.js').default[]>} terminalTag → deep wildcard expressions */
+    this._deepByTerminalTag = new Map();
+
     /** @type {Set<string>} pattern strings already added — used for deduplication */
     this._patterns = new Set();
 
@@ -51709,7 +52221,14 @@ class ExpressionSet {
     this._patterns.add(expression.pattern);
 
     if (expression.hasDeepWildcard()) {
-      this._deepWildcards.push(expression);
+      const lastSeg = expression.segments[expression.segments.length - 1];
+      if (lastSeg && lastSeg.type !== 'deep-wildcard' && lastSeg.tag !== '*') {
+        const tag = lastSeg.tag;
+        if (!this._deepByTerminalTag.has(tag)) this._deepByTerminalTag.set(tag, []);
+        this._deepByTerminalTag.get(tag).push(expression);
+      } else {
+        this._deepWildcards.push(expression);
+      }
       return this;
     }
 
@@ -51843,7 +52362,13 @@ class ExpressionSet {
       }
     }
 
-    // 3. Deep wildcards — cannot be pre-filtered by depth or tag
+    // 3. Deep wildcards — indexed by terminal tag, then unindexed fallback
+    const deepBucket = this._deepByTerminalTag.get(tag);
+    if (deepBucket) {
+      for (let i = 0; i < deepBucket.length; i++) {
+        if (matcher.matches(deepBucket[i])) return deepBucket[i];
+      }
+    }
     for (let i = 0; i < this._deepWildcards.length; i++) {
       if (matcher.matches(this._deepWildcards[i])) return this._deepWildcards[i];
     }
@@ -52959,26 +53484,6 @@ const MISC_SYMBOLS = {
   nVDash: '⊯',
 };
 
-/**
- * All entities combined (if you need everything)
- * @type {Record<string, string>}
- */
-const ALL_ENTITIES = {
-  ...BASIC_LATIN,
-  ...LATIN_ACCENTS,
-  ...LATIN_EXTENDED,
-  ...GREEK,
-  ...CYRILLIC,
-  ...MATH,
-  ...MATH_ADVANCED,
-  ...ARROWS,
-  ...SHAPES,
-  ...PUNCTUATION,
-  ...CURRENCY,
-  ...FRACTIONS,
-  ...MISC_SYMBOLS,
-};
-
 const XML = {
   amp: "&",
   apos: "'",
@@ -53657,6 +54162,152 @@ class EntityDecoder {
     return this._applyNCRAction(effective, token, cp);
   }
 }
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql.js
+/**
+ * SQL context patterns — high-precision rules only.
+ *
+ * These rules have very low false-positive risk and are safe to apply to
+ * general user text (names, descriptions, search queries, etc.).
+ * All patterns are ReDoS-safe — unlike the `sql-injection` npm package
+ * which has an active CVE on its own detection regexes.
+ *
+ * For exhaustive coverage including noisier heuristics (comment sequences,
+ * hex literals, stacked queries with semicolons), use 'SQL-STRICT' instead.
+ * Apply 'SQL-STRICT' only to strings that are specifically SQL fragments,
+ * not to general free-text fields.
+ */
+
+const SQL_PATTERNS = [
+  {
+    id: 'sql-block-comment-open',
+    description: 'SQL block comment open: /* ... */ — unusual in legitimate user text',
+    pattern: /\/\*/,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-union-select',
+    description: 'UNION SELECT — most common SQL injection aggregation attack',
+    pattern: /\bUNION\s{1,20}(?:ALL\s{1,20})?SELECT\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-drop-table',
+    description: 'DROP TABLE — destructive DDL injection',
+    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}TABLE\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-drop-database',
+    description: 'DROP DATABASE — destructive DDL injection',
+    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}DATABASE\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-insert-into',
+    description: 'INSERT INTO — data injection',
+    pattern: /\bINSERT\s{1,20}INTO\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-delete-from',
+    description: 'DELETE FROM — data deletion injection',
+    pattern: /\bDELETE\s{1,20}FROM\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-update-set',
+    description: 'UPDATE ... SET — data modification injection',
+    // Allows arbitrary content between UPDATE and SET (table name, alias, etc.)
+    pattern: /\bUPDATE\b[\s\S]{1,60}\bSET\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-exec-xp',
+    description: 'EXEC xp_ — MSSQL extended stored procedure execution',
+    pattern: /\bEXEC(?:UTE)?\s{1,20}xp_/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-tautology-string',
+    description: "Classic string tautology: ' OR '1'='1 or \" OR \"1\"=\"1\"",
+    // Last quote is optional — injection may truncate it: ' OR '1'='1--
+    pattern: /'\s{0,10}OR\s{0,10}'[^']{0,20}'\s*=\s*'[^']{0,20}/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-tautology-numeric',
+    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 1=1',
+    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}1\s*=\s*1\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-always-true-zero',
+    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 0=0',
+    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}0\s*=\s*0\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-sleep-benchmark',
+    description: 'Time-based blind injection: SLEEP() or BENCHMARK()',
+    pattern: /\b(?:SLEEP|BENCHMARK)\s*\(/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-waitfor-delay',
+    description: 'MSSQL time-based blind injection: WAITFOR DELAY',
+    pattern: /\bWAITFOR\s{1,20}DELAY\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-char-function',
+    description: 'CHAR() function — used to obfuscate injected strings',
+    pattern: /\bCHAR\s*\(\s*\d{1,3}/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-information-schema',
+    description: 'INFORMATION_SCHEMA — reconnaissance query for table/column enumeration',
+    pattern: /\bINFORMATION_SCHEMA\b/i,
+  },
+];
+
+/* harmony default export */ const sql = (SQL_PATTERNS);
+
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql-strict.js
+/**
+ * SQL-STRICT context patterns.
+ *
+ * Extends the base 'SQL' context with three additional rules that are
+ * effective at detecting real injections but carry a higher false-positive
+ * risk on general free-text input.
+ *
+ * Use 'SQL-STRICT' when:
+ *   - The string is specifically a SQL fragment or database identifier
+ *   - You control the input domain (e.g. a dedicated SQL search field)
+ *   - You can tolerate occasional false positives in exchange for broader coverage
+ *
+ * Use 'SQL' (not STRICT) when:
+ *   - The field is general user text (names, descriptions, comments)
+ *   - False positives would block legitimate content (e.g. "see note -- above")
+ *
+ * Rules moved here from 'SQL' due to false-positive risk:
+ *
+ *   sql-line-comment   — "--" fires on "see note -- above", "value--", CSS var(--primary)
+ *   sql-stacked-query  — "; SELECT" fires on legitimate prose with semicolons + SQL words
+ *   sql-hex-encoding   — "0xDEAD" fires on hex values in technical docs and log output
+ */
+
+
+
+const SQL_STRICT_EXTRA = [
+  {
+    id: 'sql-line-comment',
+    description: 'SQL line comment: -- followed by whitespace or end of string',
+    pattern: /--(?:\s|$)/,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-stacked-query',
+    description: 'Stacked queries: semicolon immediately followed by a SQL keyword',
+    pattern: /;\s{0,10}(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|CREATE|ALTER|EXEC)\b/i,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'sql-hex-encoding',
+    description: 'Hex-encoded string injection: 0x41414141 style (MySQL)',
+    pattern: /\b0x[0-9a-f]{4,}/i,
+  },
+];
+
+// SQL-STRICT = all base SQL rules + the three noisy extras
+const SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS = [...sql, ...SQL_STRICT_EXTRA];
+
+/* harmony default export */ const sql_strict = (SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS);
+
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/html.js
 /**
  * HTML context patterns.
@@ -53924,152 +54575,6 @@ const SVG_PATTERNS = [
 
 /* harmony default export */ const svg = (SVG_PATTERNS);
 
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql.js
-/**
- * SQL context patterns — high-precision rules only.
- *
- * These rules have very low false-positive risk and are safe to apply to
- * general user text (names, descriptions, search queries, etc.).
- * All patterns are ReDoS-safe — unlike the `sql-injection` npm package
- * which has an active CVE on its own detection regexes.
- *
- * For exhaustive coverage including noisier heuristics (comment sequences,
- * hex literals, stacked queries with semicolons), use 'SQL-STRICT' instead.
- * Apply 'SQL-STRICT' only to strings that are specifically SQL fragments,
- * not to general free-text fields.
- */
-
-const SQL_PATTERNS = [
-  {
-    id: 'sql-block-comment-open',
-    description: 'SQL block comment open: /* ... */ — unusual in legitimate user text',
-    pattern: /\/\*/,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-union-select',
-    description: 'UNION SELECT — most common SQL injection aggregation attack',
-    pattern: /\bUNION\s{1,20}(?:ALL\s{1,20})?SELECT\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-drop-table',
-    description: 'DROP TABLE — destructive DDL injection',
-    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}TABLE\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-drop-database',
-    description: 'DROP DATABASE — destructive DDL injection',
-    pattern: /\bDROP\s{1,20}DATABASE\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-insert-into',
-    description: 'INSERT INTO — data injection',
-    pattern: /\bINSERT\s{1,20}INTO\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-delete-from',
-    description: 'DELETE FROM — data deletion injection',
-    pattern: /\bDELETE\s{1,20}FROM\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-update-set',
-    description: 'UPDATE ... SET — data modification injection',
-    // Allows arbitrary content between UPDATE and SET (table name, alias, etc.)
-    pattern: /\bUPDATE\b[\s\S]{1,60}\bSET\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-exec-xp',
-    description: 'EXEC xp_ — MSSQL extended stored procedure execution',
-    pattern: /\bEXEC(?:UTE)?\s{1,20}xp_/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-tautology-string',
-    description: "Classic string tautology: ' OR '1'='1 or \" OR \"1\"=\"1\"",
-    // Last quote is optional — injection may truncate it: ' OR '1'='1--
-    pattern: /'\s{0,10}OR\s{0,10}'[^']{0,20}'\s*=\s*'[^']{0,20}/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-tautology-numeric',
-    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 1=1',
-    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}1\s*=\s*1\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-always-true-zero',
-    description: 'Numeric tautology: OR 0=0',
-    pattern: /\bOR\s{1,10}0\s*=\s*0\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-sleep-benchmark',
-    description: 'Time-based blind injection: SLEEP() or BENCHMARK()',
-    pattern: /\b(?:SLEEP|BENCHMARK)\s*\(/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-waitfor-delay',
-    description: 'MSSQL time-based blind injection: WAITFOR DELAY',
-    pattern: /\bWAITFOR\s{1,20}DELAY\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-char-function',
-    description: 'CHAR() function — used to obfuscate injected strings',
-    pattern: /\bCHAR\s*\(\s*\d{1,3}/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-information-schema',
-    description: 'INFORMATION_SCHEMA — reconnaissance query for table/column enumeration',
-    pattern: /\bINFORMATION_SCHEMA\b/i,
-  },
-];
-
-/* harmony default export */ const sql = (SQL_PATTERNS);
-
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/sql-strict.js
-/**
- * SQL-STRICT context patterns.
- *
- * Extends the base 'SQL' context with three additional rules that are
- * effective at detecting real injections but carry a higher false-positive
- * risk on general free-text input.
- *
- * Use 'SQL-STRICT' when:
- *   - The string is specifically a SQL fragment or database identifier
- *   - You control the input domain (e.g. a dedicated SQL search field)
- *   - You can tolerate occasional false positives in exchange for broader coverage
- *
- * Use 'SQL' (not STRICT) when:
- *   - The field is general user text (names, descriptions, comments)
- *   - False positives would block legitimate content (e.g. "see note -- above")
- *
- * Rules moved here from 'SQL' due to false-positive risk:
- *
- *   sql-line-comment   — "--" fires on "see note -- above", "value--", CSS var(--primary)
- *   sql-stacked-query  — "; SELECT" fires on legitimate prose with semicolons + SQL words
- *   sql-hex-encoding   — "0xDEAD" fires on hex values in technical docs and log output
- */
-
-
-
-const SQL_STRICT_EXTRA = [
-  {
-    id: 'sql-line-comment',
-    description: 'SQL line comment: -- followed by whitespace or end of string',
-    pattern: /--(?:\s|$)/,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-stacked-query',
-    description: 'Stacked queries: semicolon immediately followed by a SQL keyword',
-    pattern: /;\s{0,10}(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|CREATE|ALTER|EXEC)\b/i,
-  },
-  {
-    id: 'sql-hex-encoding',
-    description: 'Hex-encoded string injection: 0x41414141 style (MySQL)',
-    pattern: /\b0x[0-9a-f]{4,}/i,
-  },
-];
-
-// SQL-STRICT = all base SQL rules + the three noisy extras
-const SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS = [...sql, ...SQL_STRICT_EXTRA];
-
-/* harmony default export */ const sql_strict = (SQL_STRICT_PATTERNS);
-
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/contexts/shell.js
 /**
  * SHELL context patterns.
@@ -54455,20 +54960,22 @@ const LOG_PATTERNS = [
 
 /* harmony default export */ const log = (LOG_PATTERNS);
 
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/registry.js
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/index.js
 /**
- * Context registry — maps context name strings to their pattern arrays.
+ * is-unsafe v2
  *
- * Adding a new context: create a file in ./contexts/, export a default array
- * of pattern objects, and register it here.
+ * Zero-dependency, DOM-free, pure predicate for detecting unsafe strings
+ * across HTML, XML, SVG, SQL, SQL-STRICT, SHELL, REDOS, NOSQL, and LOG contexts.
  *
- * Context name guide:
- *   SQL        — high-precision rules; safe for general text fields
- *   SQL-STRICT — SQL + three noisier rules (line comments, stacked queries, hex);
- *                use only for SQL-specific inputs
- *   REDOS      — detects ReDoS-prone patterns when string will be compiled as RegExp
+ * v2 change: contexts are imported as named pattern arrays rather than resolved
+ * via a string-keyed registry. This makes each context independently
+ * tree-shakeable — bundlers can drop any context you never import.
+ *
+ * @module is-unsafe
  */
 
+// ─── Context pattern arrays (named exports) ────────────────────────────────
+// Import only the ones you need. Each is independently tree-shakeable.
 
 
 
@@ -54479,8 +54986,40 @@ const LOG_PATTERNS = [
 
 
 
-/** @type {Record<string, Array<{id: string, description: string, pattern: RegExp}>>} */
-const registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY = {
+// SQL-STRICT needs a quoted identifier because of the hyphen
+
+
+
+// ─── VALID_CONTEXTS convenience re-export ─────────────────────────────────
+// Importing this pulls in ALL contexts. Use it only when you need all of them
+// (e.g. for validation UI, tooling, or exhaustive audits).
+// If you only need a subset, import the named contexts directly instead.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+// ─── Attach labels to named contexts ──────────────────────────────────────
+// Each built-in PatternList carries its canonical name so matchList can read
+// list.label directly — no registry lookup needed at match time.
+// Custom PatternLists default to 'CUSTOM' unless the caller sets list.label.
+
+html.label       = 'HTML';
+xml.label        = 'XML';
+svg.label        = 'SVG';
+sql.label        = 'SQL';
+sql_strict.label = 'SQL-STRICT';
+shell.label      = 'SHELL';
+redos.label      = 'REDOS';
+nosql.label      = 'NOSQL';
+log.label        = 'LOG';
+
+const VALID_CONTEXTS = Object.freeze({
   HTML: html,
   XML: xml,
   SVG: svg,
@@ -54490,45 +55029,29 @@ const registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY = {
   REDOS: redos,
   NOSQL: nosql,
   LOG: log,
-};
+});
 
-/* harmony default export */ const registry = (registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY);
+// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /**
- * Enum of valid context names — e.g. `VALID_CONTEXTS.HTML === 'HTML'`.
- * @type {Record<string, string>}
- */
-const VALID_CONTEXTS = Object.freeze(
-  Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(registry_CONTEXT_REGISTRY).map((k) => [k, k]))
-);
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/is-unsafe/src/index.js
-/**
- * is-unsafe
- *
- * Zero-dependency, DOM-free, pure predicate for detecting unsafe strings
- * across HTML, XML, SVG, SQL, SQL-STRICT, SHELL, REDOS, NOSQL, and LOG contexts.
- *
- * @module is-unsafe
+ * @typedef {{ id: string, description: string, pattern: RegExp }} Rule
  */
 
-
-
 /**
- * @typedef {'HTML'|'XML'|'SVG'|'SQL'|'SQL-STRICT'|'SHELL'|'REDOS'|'NOSQL'|'LOG'} ContextName
+ * @typedef {Rule[]} PatternList
  */
 
 /**
  * @typedef {Object} MatchResult
- * @property {string} context   - The context in which the match was found
- * @property {string} id        - Rule identifier
+ * @property {string} context     - Label identifying which context matched ('HTML', 'CUSTOM', etc.)
+ * @property {string} id          - Rule identifier
  * @property {string} description - Human-readable description of what was matched
- * @property {RegExp} pattern   - The pattern that matched
+ * @property {RegExp} pattern     - The pattern that matched
  */
 
-// ─── Validation helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// ─── Internal helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /**
- * Validate that `value` is a string. Throws TypeError if not.
  * @param {unknown} value
  */
 function assertString(value) {
@@ -54540,56 +55063,61 @@ function assertString(value) {
 }
 
 /**
- * Validate that `context` is a recognised context name, an array of them,
- * or a RegExp instance. Throws TypeError if not.
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
+ * @param {unknown} context
  */
 function assertContext(context) {
   if (context instanceof RegExp) return;
 
-  if (typeof context === 'string') {
-    if (!registry[context]) {
-      throw new TypeError(
-        `is-unsafe: unknown context "${context}". Valid contexts: ${Object.keys(VALID_CONTEXTS).join(', ')}`
-      );
-    }
-    return;
-  }
-
   if (Array.isArray(context)) {
     if (context.length === 0) {
-      throw new TypeError('is-unsafe: context array must not be empty');
+      throw new TypeError('is-unsafe: context must not be an empty array');
     }
-    for (const c of context) {
-      if (typeof c !== 'string' || !registry[c]) {
-        throw new TypeError(
-          `is-unsafe: unknown context "${c}" in array. Valid contexts: ${Object.keys(VALID_CONTEXTS).join(', ')}`
-        );
+    // Detect array-of-arrays vs flat pattern list
+    if (Array.isArray(context[0])) {
+      // Array of PatternLists
+      for (const list of context) {
+        if (!Array.isArray(list) || list.length === 0) {
+          throw new TypeError(
+            'is-unsafe: each context in the array must be a non-empty pattern array (PatternList)'
+          );
+        }
       }
     }
+    // else: flat PatternList — trust it, no deep validation needed
     return;
   }
 
   throw new TypeError(
-    `is-unsafe: second argument must be a context string, array of context strings, or RegExp. Got: ${typeof context}`
+    `is-unsafe: second argument must be a PatternList (e.g. HTML), ` +
+    `an array of PatternLists (e.g. [HTML, XML]), or a RegExp. Got: ${typeof context}`
   );
 }
 
-// ─── Core matching logic ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Normalise any valid context arg into an array of PatternLists.
+ *
+ * @param {Rule[]|Rule[][]|RegExp} context
+ * @returns {{ lists: Rule[][]|null, regex: RegExp|null }}
+ */
+function normalise(context) {
+  if (context instanceof RegExp) return { lists: null, regex: context };
+  // Distinguish PatternList (array of rule objects) from array of PatternLists
+  if (Array.isArray(context[0])) return { lists: context, regex: null };
+  return { lists: [context], regex: null };
+}
 
 /**
- * Test a single value against one named context's patterns.
- * Returns the first matching MatchResult, or null if nothing matched.
+ * Test value against a single PatternList. Returns the first MatchResult or null.
  *
  * @param {string} value
- * @param {string} contextName
+ * @param {Rule[]} list
  * @returns {MatchResult|null}
  */
-function matchContext(value, contextName) {
-  const patterns = registry[contextName];
-  for (const rule of patterns) {
+function matchList(value, list) {
+  const label = list.label ?? 'CUSTOM';
+  for (const rule of list) {
     if (rule.pattern.test(value)) {
-      return { context: contextName, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern };
+      return { context: label, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern };
     }
   }
   return null;
@@ -54600,103 +55128,95 @@ function matchContext(value, contextName) {
 /**
  * Returns `true` if `value` is unsafe in the given context(s), `false` otherwise.
  *
- * @param {string} value           - The string to test
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
- *   - A named context ('HTML', 'XML', 'SVG', 'SQL', 'SQL-STRICT', 'SHELL', 'REDOS', 'NOSQL', 'LOG')
- *   - An array of named contexts — returns true if unsafe in **any** of them
+ * @param {string} value - The string to test
+ * @param {PatternList | PatternList[] | RegExp} context
+ *   - A PatternList imported from is-unsafe (e.g. `HTML`, `XML`)
+ *   - An array of PatternLists — returns true if unsafe in **any** of them
  *   - A custom RegExp — returns true if the pattern matches
  * @returns {boolean}
  *
  * @example
- * isUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', 'HTML')  // true
- * isUnsafe('hello world', 'HTML')                // false
- * isUnsafe('value', ['HTML', 'SQL'])             // false
- * isUnsafe('value', /my-pattern/i)               // false
+ * import { isUnsafe, HTML, SQL } from 'is-unsafe';
+ *
+ * isUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', HTML)       // true
+ * isUnsafe('hello world', HTML)                     // false
+ * isUnsafe('value', [HTML, SQL])                    // false
+ * isUnsafe('value', /my-pattern/i)                  // false
  */
 function isUnsafe(value, context) {
   assertString(value);
   assertContext(context);
 
-  // Custom RegExp — caller-supplied pattern
-  if (context instanceof RegExp) {
-    return context.test(value);
-  }
+  const { lists, regex } = normalise(context);
 
-  // Single named context
-  if (typeof context === 'string') {
-    return matchContext(value, context) !== null;
-  }
+  if (regex) return regex.test(value);
 
-  // Array of named contexts — unsafe if ANY context matches
-  for (const c of context) {
-    if (matchContext(value, c) !== null) return true;
+  for (const list of lists) {
+    if (matchList(value, list) !== null) return true;
   }
   return false;
 }
 
 /**
- * Like `isUnsafe`, but instead of a boolean returns the first `MatchResult`
- * describing **why** the value was flagged, or `null` if it is safe.
- *
- * Useful for logging, error messages, or policy reporting.
+ * Like `isUnsafe`, but returns the first `MatchResult` describing **why**
+ * the value was flagged, or `null` if it is safe.
  *
  * @param {string} value
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
+ * @param {PatternList | PatternList[] | RegExp} context
  * @returns {MatchResult|null}
  *
  * @example
- * whyUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', 'HTML')
+ * import { whyUnsafe, HTML } from 'is-unsafe';
+ *
+ * whyUnsafe('<script>alert(1)</script>', HTML)
  * // { context: 'HTML', id: 'html-script-open', description: '...', pattern: /.../ }
  */
 function whyUnsafe(value, context) {
   assertString(value);
   assertContext(context);
 
-  if (context instanceof RegExp) {
-    return context.test(value)
-      ? { context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: context }
+  const { lists, regex } = normalise(context);
+
+  if (regex) {
+    return regex.test(value)
+      ? { context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: regex }
       : null;
   }
 
-  if (typeof context === 'string') {
-    return matchContext(value, context);
-  }
-
-  for (const c of context) {
-    const result = matchContext(value, c);
+  for (const list of lists) {
+    const result = matchList(value, list);
     if (result !== null) return result;
   }
   return null;
 }
 
 /**
- * Returns all matching rules across the given context(s), or an empty array
- * if the value is safe. Useful for comprehensive auditing.
+ * Returns **all** matching rules across the given context(s), or an empty
+ * array if the value is safe. Useful for comprehensive auditing.
  *
  * @param {string} value
- * @param {ContextName|ContextName[]|RegExp} context
+ * @param {PatternList | PatternList[] | RegExp} context
  * @returns {MatchResult[]}
  */
 function allUnsafe(value, context) {
   assertString(value);
   assertContext(context);
 
+  const { lists, regex } = normalise(context);
   const results = [];
 
-  if (context instanceof RegExp) {
-    if (context.test(value)) {
-      results.push({ context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: context });
+  if (regex) {
+    if (regex.test(value)) {
+      results.push({ context: 'CUSTOM', id: 'custom-regex', description: 'Matched caller-supplied pattern', pattern: regex });
     }
     return results;
   }
 
-  const contexts = typeof context === 'string' ? [context] : context;
-
-  for (const c of contexts) {
-    const patterns = CONTEXT_REGISTRY[c];
-    for (const rule of patterns) {
+  for (const list of lists) {
+    const label = list.label ?? 'CUSTOM';
+    for (const rule of list) {
       if (rule.pattern.test(value)) {
-        results.push({ context: c, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern });
+        results.push({ context: label, id: rule.id, description: rule.description, pattern: rule.pattern });
       }
     }
   }
@@ -54706,6 +55226,7 @@ function allUnsafe(value, context) {
 
 
 /* harmony default export */ const src = ((/* unused pure expression or super */ null && (isUnsafe)));
+
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/fast-xml-parser/src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js
 
 ///@ts-check
@@ -54796,6 +55317,7 @@ class OrderedObjParser {
     this.ignoreAttributesFn = getIgnoreAttributesFn(this.options.ignoreAttributes)
     this.entityExpansionCount = 0;
     this.currentExpandedLength = 0;
+    this.doctypefound = false;
     let namedEntities = { ...XML };
     if (this.options.entityDecoder) {
       this.entityDecoder = this.options.entityDecoder
@@ -54813,8 +55335,7 @@ class OrderedObjParser {
         // onExternalEntity: (name, value) => isUnsafe(value) ? 'block' : 'allow',
         onInputEntity: (name, value) =>
           //TODO: VALID_CONTEXTS.HTML should be set only if this.options.htmlEntities
-          isUnsafe(value, [VALID_CONTEXTS.HTML, VALID_CONTEXTS.XML])
-            ? ENTITY_ACTION.BLOCK : ENTITY_ACTION.ALLOW,
+          isUnsafe(value, [html, xml]) ? ENTITY_ACTION.BLOCK : ENTITY_ACTION.ALLOW,
 
         //postCheck: resolved => resolved
       });
@@ -55004,6 +55525,7 @@ const parseXml = function (xmlData) {
   // Reset entity expansion counters for this document
   this.entityExpansionCount = 0;
   this.currentExpandedLength = 0;
+  this.doctypefound = false;
   const options = this.options;
   const docTypeReader = new DocTypeReader(options.processEntities);
   const xmlLen = xmlData.length;
@@ -55088,6 +55610,8 @@ const parseXml = function (xmlData) {
         i = endIndex;
       } else if (c1 === 33
         && xmlData.charCodeAt(i + 2) === 68) { //'!D'
+        if (this.doctypefound) throw new Error("Multiple DOCTYPE declarations found.");
+        this.doctypefound = true;
         const result = docTypeReader.readDocType(xmlData, i);
         this.entityDecoder.addInputEntities(result.entities);
         i = result.i;
@@ -56247,6 +56771,277 @@ function safeCdata(val) {
 function escapeAttribute(val) {
   return String(val).replace(/"/g, '&quot;').replace(/'/g, '&apos;')
 }
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/xml-naming/src/index.js
+/**
+ * xml-naming
+ * Validates XML Name productions as defined in the XML 1.0 and 1.1 specifications.
+ * Covers: Name, NCName, QName, NMToken, NMTokens
+ *
+ * XML 1.0 spec: https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#NT-Name
+ * XML 1.1 spec: https://www.w3.org/TR/xml11/#NT-NameStartChar
+ * XML NS spec:  https://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/#NT-NCName
+ */
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Character class strings — XML 1.0
+//
+// NameStartChar ::= ":" | [A-Z] | "_" | [a-z]
+//   | [#xC0-#xD6]   | [#xD8-#xF6]   | [#xF8-#x2FF]
+//   | [#x370-#x37D] | [#x37F-#x1FFF]    <- split to exclude #x0487
+//   | [#x200C-#x200D]
+//   | [#x2070-#x218F] | [#x2C00-#x2FEF]
+//   | [#x3001-#xD7FF] | [#xF900-#xFDCF] | [#xFDF0-#xFFFD]
+//
+// NameChar ::= NameStartChar | "-" | "." | [0-9]
+//   | #xB7 | [#x0300-#x036F] | [#x203F-#x2040]
+//
+// Note: \u0487 (Combining Cyrillic Millions Sign) was added in Unicode 4.0,
+// after XML 1.0 was defined against Unicode 2.0. It falls inside the range
+// \u037F-\u1FFF but must be excluded. We split that range into
+// \u037F-\u0486 and \u0488-\u1FFF to exclude it explicitly.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_nameStartChar10 =
+  ':A-Za-z_' +
+  '\u00C0-\u00D6\u00D8-\u00F6\u00F8-\u02FF' +
+  '\u0370-\u037D' +
+  '\u037F-\u0486\u0488-\u1FFF' +  // split to exclude \u0487
+  '\u200C-\u200D' +
+  '\u2070-\u218F' +
+  '\u2C00-\u2FEF' +
+  '\u3001-\uD7FF' +
+  '\uF900-\uFDCF' +
+  '\uFDF0-\uFFFD';
+
+const src_nameChar10 =
+  src_nameStartChar10 +
+  '\\-\\.\\d' +
+  '\u00B7' +
+  '\u0300-\u036F' +
+  '\u203F-\u2040';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Character class strings — XML 1.1
+//
+// Differences from XML 1.0:
+//
+// NameStartChar:
+//   1.0 has split ranges: \u00C0-\u00D6, \u00D8-\u00F6, \u00F8-\u02FF
+//   1.1 merges them into: \u00C0-\u02FF
+//   (\u00D7 x and \u00F7 / are division symbols, excluded in both versions)
+//
+//   1.0 tops out at \uFFFD (BMP only)
+//   1.1 adds \u{10000}-\u{EFFFF} (supplementary planes)
+//   These require the /u flag on the RegExp — see buildRegexes below.
+//
+// NameChar:
+//   1.1 adds \u0487 (Combining Cyrillic Millions Sign, added in Unicode 4.0)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_nameStartChar11 =
+  ':A-Za-z_' +
+  '\u00C0-\u02FF' +                    // merged — 1.0 had three split ranges here
+  '\u0370-\u037D' +
+  '\u037F-\u0486\u0488-\u1FFF' +       // split to exclude \u0487 (combining mark, never a NameStartChar)
+  '\u200C-\u200D' +
+  '\u2070-\u218F' +
+  '\u2C00-\u2FEF' +
+  '\u3001-\uD7FF' +
+  '\uF900-\uFDCF' +
+  '\uFDF0-\uFFFD' +
+  '\u{10000}-\u{EFFFF}';     // supplementary planes — REQUIRES /u flag on RegExp
+
+const src_nameChar11 =
+  src_nameStartChar11 +
+  '\\-\\.\\d' +
+  '\u00B7' +
+  '\u0300-\u036F' +
+  '\u0487' +                 // Combining Cyrillic Millions Sign — valid in 1.1, not 1.0
+  '\u203F-\u2040';
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Regex builders
+//
+// XML 1.0 regexes: no flags — BMP only, standard JS regex behaviour.
+// XML 1.1 regexes: /u flag — required for \u{10000}-\u{EFFFF} to match actual
+//   supplementary code points rather than lone surrogates (which are illegal XML).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_buildRegexes = (startChar, char, flags = '') => {
+  const ncStart = startChar.replace(':', '');
+  const ncChar = char.replace(':', '');
+  const ncNamePat = `[${ncStart}][${ncChar}]*`;
+
+  return {
+    name: new RegExp(`^[${startChar}][${char}]*$`, flags),
+    ncName: new RegExp(`^${ncNamePat}$`, flags),
+    qName: new RegExp(`^${ncNamePat}(?::${ncNamePat})?$`, flags),
+    nmToken: new RegExp(`^[${char}]+$`, flags),
+    nmTokens: new RegExp(`^[${char}]+(?:\\s+[${char}]+)*$`, flags),
+  };
+};
+
+const src_regexes10 = src_buildRegexes(src_nameStartChar10, src_nameChar10);       // no /u — BMP only
+const src_regexes11 = src_buildRegexes(src_nameStartChar11, src_nameChar11, 'u');  // /u — enables \u{10000}-\u{EFFFF}
+
+const src_getRegexes = (xmlVersion = '1.0') =>
+  xmlVersion === '1.1' ? src_regexes11 : src_regexes10;
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Boolean validators
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid XML Name.
+ * Colons are allowed anywhere (Name production).
+ * Used for: DOCTYPE entity names, notation names, DTD element declarations.
+ */
+const xml_naming_src_name = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion).name.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid NCName (Non-Colonized Name).
+ * Colons are not permitted.
+ * Used for: namespace prefixes, local names, SVG id attributes.
+ */
+const src_ncName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion).ncName.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid QName (Qualified Name).
+ * Allows exactly one colon as a prefix separator: prefix:localName.
+ * Used for: element and attribute names in namespace-aware XML/SVG.
+ */
+const src_qName = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion).qName.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid NMToken.
+ * Like Name but no restriction on the first character.
+ * Used for: DTD NMTOKEN attribute values.
+ */
+const src_nmToken = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion).nmToken.test(str);
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if the string is a valid NMTokens value.
+ * A whitespace-separated list of NMToken values.
+ * Used for: DTD NMTOKENS attribute values.
+ */
+const src_nmTokens = (str, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) =>
+  src_getRegexes(xmlVersion).nmTokens.test(str);
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Diagnostic validator
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const src_PRODUCTIONS = (/* unused pure expression or super */ null && (['name', 'ncName', 'qName', 'nmToken', 'nmTokens']));
+
+/**
+ * Validates a string against a named production and returns a detailed result.
+ *
+ * @param {string} str
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1' }} [opts]
+ * @returns {{ valid: boolean, production: string, input: string, reason?: string, position?: number }}
+ */
+const src_validate = (str, production, { xmlVersion = '1.0' } = {}) => {
+  if (!src_PRODUCTIONS.includes(production)) {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      `Unknown production "${production}". Must be one of: ${src_PRODUCTIONS.join(', ')}`
+    );
+  }
+
+  const validators = { name: xml_naming_src_name, ncName: src_ncName, qName: src_qName, nmToken: src_nmToken, nmTokens: src_nmTokens };
+  const isValid = validators[production](str, { xmlVersion });
+
+  if (isValid) return { valid: true, production, input: str };
+
+  let reason = 'Does not match the production rules';
+  let position;
+
+  if (str.length === 0) {
+    reason = 'Input is empty';
+  } else if (production === 'ncName' && str.includes(':')) {
+    position = str.indexOf(':');
+    reason = 'Colon is not allowed in NCName';
+  } else if (production === 'qName' && str.startsWith(':')) {
+    reason = 'QName cannot start with a colon';
+    position = 0;
+  } else if (production === 'qName' && str.endsWith(':')) {
+    reason = 'QName cannot end with a colon';
+    position = str.length - 1;
+  } else if (production === 'qName' && (str.match(/:/g) || []).length > 1) {
+    reason = 'QName can have at most one colon';
+    position = str.lastIndexOf(':');
+  } else if (
+    ['name', 'ncName', 'qName'].includes(production) &&
+    !/^[:A-Za-z_\u00C0-\uFFFD]/.test(str[0])
+  ) {
+    reason = `First character "${str[0]}" is not a valid NameStartChar`;
+    position = 0;
+  } else {
+    for (let i = 0; i < str.length; i++) {
+      if (!/[\w\-\\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/.test(str[i])) {
+        reason = `Character "${str[i]}" at position ${i} is not a valid NameChar`;
+        position = i;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { valid: false, production, input: str, reason, position };
+};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Batch validator
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Validates an array of strings against a named production.
+ *
+ * @param {string[]} strings
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ xmlVersion?: '1.0'|'1.1' }} [opts]
+ * @returns {Array<{ valid: boolean, production: string, input: string, reason?: string, position?: number }>}
+ */
+const src_validateAll = (strings, production, opts = {}) =>
+  strings.map(str => src_validate(str, production, opts));
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Sanitizer
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Transforms an invalid string into the nearest valid XML name for the given production.
+ *
+ * @param {string} str
+ * @param {'name'|'ncName'|'qName'|'nmToken'|'nmTokens'} production
+ * @param {{ replacement?: string }} [opts]
+ * @returns {string}
+ */
+const src_sanitize = (str, production = 'name', { replacement = '_' } = {}) => {
+  if (!str) return replacement;
+
+  let result = str;
+
+  // Strip colons for NCName
+  if (production === 'ncName') {
+    result = result.replace(/:/g, '');
+  }
+
+  // Replace illegal characters
+  result = result.replace(/[^\w\-\.:\u00B7\u00C0-\uFFFD]/g, replacement);
+
+  // Fix invalid start character for Name / NCName / QName
+  if (production !== 'nmToken' && production !== 'nmTokens') {
+    if (/^[\-\.\d]/.test(result)) {
+      result = replacement + result;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result || replacement;
+};
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/fast-xml-builder/src/orderedJs2Xml.js
 
 
@@ -56290,7 +57085,7 @@ function detectXmlVersionFromArray(jArray, options) {
  */
 function resolveTagName(name, isAttribute, options, matcher, xmlVersion) {
     if (!options.sanitizeName) return name;
-    if (qName(name, { xmlVersion })) return name;
+    if (src_qName(name, { xmlVersion })) return name;
     return options.sanitizeName(name, { isAttribute, matcher: matcher.readOnly() });
 }
 
@@ -56763,7 +57558,7 @@ function detectXmlVersionFromObj(jObj, options) {
  */
 function fxb_resolveTagName(name, isAttribute, options, matcher, xmlVersion) {
   if (!options.sanitizeName) return name;
-  if (qName(name, { xmlVersion })) return name;
+  if (src_qName(name, { xmlVersion })) return name;
   return options.sanitizeName(name, { isAttribute, matcher: matcher.readOnly() });
 }
 
@@ -102610,6 +103405,17 @@ const closePattern = /\\}/g;
 const commaPattern = /\\,/g;
 const periodPattern = /\\\./g;
 const EXPANSION_MAX = 100_000;
+// `EXPANSION_MAX` caps the *number* of expansions, but not their length. An
+// input like `'{a,b}'.repeat(1500)` stays under that count - its output is
+// truncated to 100k results - while making every result ~1500 characters
+// long. The result set, and the intermediate arrays built while combining
+// brace sets, then grow large enough to exhaust memory and crash the process
+// (CVE-2026-14257). `EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH` bounds the total number of
+// characters the accumulator may hold at any point, so memory stays flat no
+// matter how many brace groups are chained. The limit sits well above any
+// realistic expansion (100k results hitting `EXPANSION_MAX` measure ~1M
+// characters) so legitimate input is unaffected.
+const EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH = 4_000_000;
 function numeric(str) {
     return !isNaN(str) ? parseInt(str, 10) : str.charCodeAt(0);
 }
@@ -102659,7 +103465,7 @@ function esm_expand(str, options = {}) {
     if (!str) {
         return [];
     }
-    const { max = EXPANSION_MAX } = options;
+    const { max = EXPANSION_MAX, maxLength = EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH } = options;
     // I don't know why Bash 4.3 does this, but it does.
     // Anything starting with {} will have the first two bytes preserved
     // but *only* at the top level, so {},a}b will not expand to anything,
@@ -102669,7 +103475,7 @@ function esm_expand(str, options = {}) {
     if (str.slice(0, 2) === '{}') {
         str = '\\{\\}' + str.slice(2);
     }
-    return expand_(escapeBraces(str), max, true).map(unescapeBraces);
+    return expand_(escapeBraces(str), max, maxLength, true).map(unescapeBraces);
 }
 function embrace(str) {
     return '{' + str + '}';
@@ -102683,22 +103489,117 @@ function lte(i, y) {
 function gte(i, y) {
     return i >= y;
 }
-function expand_(str, max, isTop) {
-    /** @type {string[]} */
-    const expansions = [];
-    const m = balanced('{', '}', str);
-    if (!m)
-        return [str];
-    // no need to expand pre, since it is guaranteed to be free of brace-sets
-    const pre = m.pre;
-    const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [''];
-    if (/\$$/.test(m.pre)) {
-        for (let k = 0; k < post.length && k < max; k++) {
-            const expansion = pre + '{' + m.body + '}' + post[k];
-            expansions.push(expansion);
+// Build `{ acc[a] + pre + values[v] }` for every combination, capping the
+// number of results at `max` and the total number of characters at `maxLength`.
+// This is the one place output grows, so bounding it here keeps the single
+// accumulator - and therefore memory - flat regardless of how many brace groups
+// are combined (CVE-2026-14257).
+function combine(acc, pre, values, max, maxLength, dropEmpties) {
+    const out = [];
+    let length = 0;
+    for (let a = 0; a < acc.length; a++) {
+        for (let v = 0; v < values.length; v++) {
+            if (out.length >= max)
+                return out;
+            const expansion = acc[a] + pre + values[v];
+            // Bash drops empty results at the top level. Skip them before they count
+            // against `max`, so `max` bounds the number of *kept* results.
+            if (dropEmpties && !expansion)
+                continue;
+            if (length + expansion.length > maxLength)
+                return out;
+            out.push(expansion);
+            length += expansion.length;
         }
     }
-    else {
+    return out;
+}
+// The expansion values of a single numeric (`1..5`) or alphabetic (`a..e..2`)
+// sequence body.
+function expandSequence(body, isAlphaSequence, max, maxLength) {
+    const n = body.split(/\.\./);
+    const N = [];
+    // A sequence body always splits into two or three parts, but the compiler
+    // can't know that.
+    /* c8 ignore start */
+    if (n[0] === undefined || n[1] === undefined) {
+        return N;
+    }
+    /* c8 ignore stop */
+    const x = numeric(n[0]);
+    const y = numeric(n[1]);
+    const width = Math.max(n[0].length, n[1].length);
+    let incr = n.length === 3 && n[2] !== undefined ?
+        Math.max(Math.abs(numeric(n[2])), 1)
+        : 1;
+    let test = lte;
+    const reverse = y < x;
+    if (reverse) {
+        incr *= -1;
+        test = gte;
+    }
+    const pad = n.some(isPadded);
+    let length = 0;
+    for (let i = x; test(i, y) && N.length < max; i += incr) {
+        let c;
+        if (isAlphaSequence) {
+            c = String.fromCharCode(i);
+            if (c === '\\') {
+                c = '';
+            }
+        }
+        else {
+            c = String(i);
+            if (pad) {
+                const need = width - c.length;
+                if (need > 0) {
+                    const z = new Array(need + 1).join('0');
+                    if (i < 0) {
+                        c = '-' + z + c.slice(1);
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        c = z + c;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (length + c.length > maxLength)
+            break;
+        N.push(c);
+        length += c.length;
+    }
+    return N;
+}
+function expand_(str, max, maxLength, isTop) {
+    // Consume the string's top-level brace groups left to right, threading a
+    // running set of combined prefixes (`acc`). Expanding the tail iteratively -
+    // rather than recursing on `m.post` once per group - keeps the native stack
+    // depth constant, so deeply chained input (`'{a,b}'.repeat(3000)`) can no
+    // longer overflow the stack, and leaves a single accumulator whose size
+    // `maxLength` bounds directly (CVE-2026-14257).
+    let acc = [''];
+    // Bash drops empty results, but only when the *first* top-level group is a
+    // comma set - a sequence like `{a..\}` may legitimately yield ''. The drop
+    // is on the final strings, so it is applied to whichever `combine` produces
+    // them (the one with no brace set left in the tail).
+    let dropEmpties = false;
+    let firstGroup = true;
+    for (;;) {
+        const m = balanced('{', '}', str);
+        // No brace set left: the rest of the string is literal.
+        if (!m) {
+            return combine(acc, str, [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties);
+        }
+        // no need to expand pre, since it is guaranteed to be free of brace-sets
+        const pre = m.pre;
+        if (/\$$/.test(pre)) {
+            acc = combine(acc, pre + '{' + m.body + '}', [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties && !m.post.length);
+            firstGroup = false;
+            if (!m.post.length)
+                break;
+            str = m.post;
+            continue;
+        }
         const isNumericSequence = /^-?\d+\.\.-?\d+(?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
         const isAlphaSequence = /^[a-zA-Z]\.\.[a-zA-Z](?:\.\.-?\d+)?$/.test(m.body);
         const isSequence = isNumericSequence || isAlphaSequence;
@@ -102707,87 +103608,69 @@ function expand_(str, max, isTop) {
             // {a},b}
             if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
                 str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
-                return expand_(str, max, true);
+                isTop = true;
+                continue;
             }
-            return [str];
+            // Nothing here expands, so the whole remaining string is literal.
+            return combine(acc, pre + '{' + m.body + '}' + m.post, [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties);
         }
-        let n;
+        if (firstGroup) {
+            dropEmpties = isTop && !isSequence;
+            firstGroup = false;
+        }
+        let values;
         if (isSequence) {
-            n = m.body.split(/\.\./);
+            values = expandSequence(m.body, isAlphaSequence, max, maxLength);
         }
         else {
-            n = parseCommaParts(m.body);
+            let n = parseCommaParts(m.body);
             if (n.length === 1 && n[0] !== undefined) {
                 // x{{a,b}}y ==> x{a}y x{b}y
-                n = expand_(n[0], max, false).map(embrace);
+                n = expand_(n[0], max, maxLength, false).map(embrace);
                 //XXX is this necessary? Can't seem to hit it in tests.
                 /* c8 ignore start */
                 if (n.length === 1) {
-                    return post.map(p => m.pre + n[0] + p);
+                    acc = combine(acc, pre + n[0], [''], max, maxLength, dropEmpties && !m.post.length);
+                    if (!m.post.length)
+                        break;
+                    str = m.post;
+                    continue;
                 }
                 /* c8 ignore stop */
             }
-        }
-        // at this point, n is the parts, and we know it's not a comma set
-        // with a single entry.
-        let N;
-        if (isSequence && n[0] !== undefined && n[1] !== undefined) {
-            const x = numeric(n[0]);
-            const y = numeric(n[1]);
-            const width = Math.max(n[0].length, n[1].length);
-            let incr = n.length === 3 && n[2] !== undefined ?
-                Math.max(Math.abs(numeric(n[2])), 1)
-                : 1;
-            let test = lte;
-            const reverse = y < x;
-            if (reverse) {
-                incr *= -1;
-                test = gte;
+            // Values that `combine` is going to drop as empty produce no result, so
+            // they must not count against `max` - otherwise `{a,,b}` with `max: 2`
+            // would stop at `['a', '']` and yield one result instead of two. Skipping
+            // them outright keeps `values` bounded while leaving `max` a bound on
+            // *kept* results.
+            let dropsEmpties = dropEmpties && !m.post.length && !pre;
+            for (let d = 0; dropsEmpties && d < acc.length; d++) {
+                if (acc[d]) {
+                    dropsEmpties = false;
+                }
             }
-            const pad = n.some(isPadded);
-            N = [];
-            for (let i = x; test(i, y) && N.length < max; i += incr) {
-                let c;
-                if (isAlphaSequence) {
-                    c = String.fromCharCode(i);
-                    if (c === '\\') {
-                        c = '';
+            values = [];
+            let valuesLength = 0;
+            outer: for (let j = 0; j < n.length; j++) {
+                const expanded = expand_(n[j], max, maxLength, false);
+                for (let k = 0; k < expanded.length; k++) {
+                    const v = expanded[k];
+                    if (dropsEmpties && !v)
+                        continue;
+                    if (values.length >= max || valuesLength + v.length > maxLength) {
+                        break outer;
                     }
-                }
-                else {
-                    c = String(i);
-                    if (pad) {
-                        const need = width - c.length;
-                        if (need > 0) {
-                            const z = new Array(need + 1).join('0');
-                            if (i < 0) {
-                                c = '-' + z + c.slice(1);
-                            }
-                            else {
-                                c = z + c;
-                            }
-                        }
-                    }
-                }
-                N.push(c);
-            }
-        }
-        else {
-            N = [];
-            for (let j = 0; j < n.length; j++) {
-                N.push.apply(N, expand_(n[j], max, false));
-            }
-        }
-        for (let j = 0; j < N.length; j++) {
-            for (let k = 0; k < post.length && expansions.length < max; k++) {
-                const expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k];
-                if (!isTop || isSequence || expansion) {
-                    expansions.push(expansion);
+                    values.push(v);
+                    valuesLength += v.length;
                 }
             }
         }
+        acc = combine(acc, pre, values, max, maxLength, dropEmpties && !m.post.length);
+        if (!m.post.length)
+            break;
+        str = m.post;
     }
-    return expansions;
+    return acc;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./node_modules/@actions/glob/node_modules/minimatch/dist/esm/assert-valid-pattern.js
diff --git a/externals/install-dotnet.ps1 b/externals/install-dotnet.ps1
index 3fa9025..6fc01ba 100644
--- a/externals/install-dotnet.ps1
+++ b/externals/install-dotnet.ps1
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ function Extract-Dotnet-Package-Tar([string]$TarPath, [string]$OutPath) {
 
     foreach ($dir in $versionedDirs.GetEnumerator()) {
         if ($dir.Value) {
-            # This versioned directory already exists — exclude it from extraction
+            # This versioned directory already exists - exclude it from extraction
             $pattern = $dir.Key + '*'
             $excludeArgs += '--exclude'
             $excludeArgs += $pattern
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ function Extract-Dotnet-Package-Tar([string]$TarPath, [string]$OutPath) {
             if ($normalizedEntry.EndsWith('/')) { continue }
             $match = [regex]::Match($normalizedEntry, $versionRegex)
             if (-not $match.Success) {
-                # Non-versioned file — exclude if it already exists locally
+                # Non-versioned file - exclude if it already exists locally
                 $localPath = Join-Path -Path $OutPath -ChildPath $normalizedEntry
                 if (Test-Path $localPath) {
                     $excludeArgs += '--exclude'
@@ -1487,8 +1487,8 @@ Say "Installation finished"
 # SIG # Begin signature block
 # MIIncQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIInYjCCJ14CAQExDzANBglghkgBZQMEAgEFADB5Bgor
 # BgEEAYI3AgEEoGswaTA0BgorBgEEAYI3AgEeMCYCAwEAAAQQH8w7YFlLCE63JNLG
-# KX7zUQIBAAIBAAIBAAIBAAIBADAxMA0GCWCGSAFlAwQCAQUABCDmNI7+9b4lSWsX
-# 2kYVvqQHpZeXB6Kt5BepNOcmIqEK1aCCDMkwggYEMIID7KADAgECAhMzAAACHPrN
+# KX7zUQIBAAIBAAIBAAIBAAIBADAxMA0GCWCGSAFlAwQCAQUABCDbixcRHZx4cmqV
+# 58QdPY+XiwQw34JjAyv8LsJIGTKYs6CCDMkwggYEMIID7KADAgECAhMzAAACHPrN
 # xZvoL37EAAAAAAIcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMFcxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMR4wHAYD
 # VQQKExVNaWNyb3NvZnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xKDAmBgNVBAMTH01pY3Jvc29mdCBD
 # b2RlIFNpZ25pbmcgUENBIDIwMjQwHhcNMjYwNDE2MTg1OTQxWhcNMjcwNDE1MTg1
@@ -1561,62 +1561,62 @@ Say "Installation finished"
 # KDAmBgNVBAMTH01pY3Jvc29mdCBDb2RlIFNpZ25pbmcgUENBIDIwMjQCEzMAAAIc
 # +s3Fm+gvfsQAAAAAAhwwDQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBQCgga4wGQYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQwG
 # CisGAQQBgjcCAQQwHAYKKwYBBAGCNwIBCzEOMAwGCisGAQQBgjcCARUwLwYJKoZI
-# hvcNAQkEMSIEIB5Na9P++kVnSeIy27N4IyRD4N0sjfWHRS1ht0NHdoK/MEIGCisG
+# hvcNAQkEMSIEIPGYOwqjbYcPpGhrXbJoGwiSMzNy0DFg1wPuMKjzUFU3MEIGCisG
 # AQQBgjcCAQwxNDAyoBSAEgBNAGkAYwByAG8AcwBvAGYAdKEagBhodHRwOi8vd3d3
-# Lm1pY3Jvc29mdC5jb20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAx05EI+Kk4hoAKG/8oVdr
-# UIq/+sv+E0vpSyWQMTq/yrkfnPWqT2TxNVtcG3ZcQT5/36cjMe1umi1zzy178VRP
-# HKH2jxMOzMqtJPsAI/yAd46EOyTBwayS+27NOvz2r3v8WV0YjuplJb1teHmJtoIf
-# UVC1va6H668UMrR2Mm5l8GvtcrGmDLjq3FLTLeidco7aj7xtkwUhyXvCS/HzoF9G
-# yrYW3NKqIy+KbNXTD8RbwDxKvx3ED9C1SfZi3fi/t1a2wjNsxVqf4XNsO2+JvuuO
-# SGTZOoo/3jqtS22IcV5Z3In0D3+C/rigq0179KhwPtztz4+J9MU5gtGmVayF1MH1
-# M6GCF7AwghesBgorBgEEAYI3AwMBMYIXnDCCF5gGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCCF4kwgheF
+# Lm1pY3Jvc29mdC5jb20wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEATEc7CdUQlF9ad/L6EImG
+# GP+g++vMy0R/Hg4c+MlO/1U5MYfOdh4p0OSk0R3D9KhIvGy0pmPFjbCovy8OT1o0
+# /SmlfLvdZi71NTu7USS9IBaGa34XbhtETx7bqyEuFVyJi3Q6kem+/FX4X9Yy1uKa
+# raasZebqi0W5Bwmm/l2W2vJoRejOf73LY/JVDJDoqC6Euy0ygFMRcXKuy0JapfNW
+# uzhOnMSTeEhxSnJulIJT9WJ27C0C3xCs15Zxog1pTCIyrUdZ+1wztImKRG6ckOMs
+# stSyISi+BDDDZlEIrqW28uhS3y1NamvJ8ParfgUUMWE6IVMfXyU3UNX9CffZlZUu
+# G6GCF7AwghesBgorBgEEAYI3AwMBMYIXnDCCF5gGCSqGSIb3DQEHAqCCF4kwgheF
 # AgEDMQ8wDQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBQAwggFaBgsqhkiG9w0BCRABBKCCAUkEggFFMIIB
-# QQIBAQYKKwYBBAGEWQoDATAxMA0GCWCGSAFlAwQCAQUABCDhOUY7jtQW2mTHjZaf
-# zhylI7IWKlybklUpfwDq0GnW8AIGaeuhCndSGBMyMDI2MDUxNzAwNDk0OC4wNzFa
+# QQIBAQYKKwYBBAGEWQoDATAxMA0GCWCGSAFlAwQCAQUABCAKISNs7txQuaBSV3EX
+# ZialoNXK4+PNZXnxI6CUNBDKJwIGajVNcfmeGBMyMDI2MDcxOTAxMTk1MS40NTVa
 # MASAAgH0oIHZpIHWMIHTMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKV2FzaGluZ3Rv
 # bjEQMA4GA1UEBxMHUmVkbW9uZDEeMBwGA1UEChMVTWljcm9zb2Z0IENvcnBvcmF0
 # aW9uMS0wKwYDVQQLEyRNaWNyb3NvZnQgSXJlbGFuZCBPcGVyYXRpb25zIExpbWl0
-# ZWQxJzAlBgNVBAsTHm5TaGllbGQgVFNTIEVTTjoyQTFBLTA1RTAtRDk0NzElMCMG
+# ZWQxJzAlBgNVBAsTHm5TaGllbGQgVFNTIEVTTjo0MDFBLTA1RTAtRDk0NzElMCMG
 # A1UEAxMcTWljcm9zb2Z0IFRpbWUtU3RhbXAgU2VydmljZaCCEf4wggcoMIIFEKAD
-# AgECAhMzAAACEKvN5BYY7zmwAAEAAAIQMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMHwxCzAJBgNV
+# AgECAhMzAAACGV6y2FR19LGNAAEAAAIZMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMHwxCzAJBgNV
 # BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdSZWRtb25kMR4w
 # HAYDVQQKExVNaWNyb3NvZnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xJjAkBgNVBAMTHU1pY3Jvc29m
-# dCBUaW1lLVN0YW1wIFBDQSAyMDEwMB4XDTI1MDgxNDE4NDgxMloXDTI2MTExMzE4
-# NDgxMlowgdMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYD
+# dCBUaW1lLVN0YW1wIFBDQSAyMDEwMB4XDTI1MDgxNDE4NDgyNloXDTI2MTExMzE4
+# NDgyNlowgdMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYD
 # VQQHEwdSZWRtb25kMR4wHAYDVQQKExVNaWNyb3NvZnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xLTAr
 # BgNVBAsTJE1pY3Jvc29mdCBJcmVsYW5kIE9wZXJhdGlvbnMgTGltaXRlZDEnMCUG
-# A1UECxMeblNoaWVsZCBUU1MgRVNOOjJBMUEtMDVFMC1EOTQ3MSUwIwYDVQQDExxN
+# A1UECxMeblNoaWVsZCBUU1MgRVNOOjQwMUEtMDVFMC1EOTQ3MSUwIwYDVQQDExxN
 # aWNyb3NvZnQgVGltZS1TdGFtcCBTZXJ2aWNlMIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOC
-# Ag8AMIICCgKCAgEAjcc4q057ZwIgpKu4pTXWLejvYEduRf+1mIpbiJEMFWWmU2xp
-# ip+zK7xFxKGB1CclUXBU0/ZQZ6LG8H0gI7yvosrsPEI1DPB/XccGCvswKbAKckng
-# OuGTEPGk7K/vEZa9h0Xt02b7m2n9MdIjkLrFl0pDriKyz0QHGpdh93X6+NApfE1T
-# L24Vo0xkeoFGpL3rX9gXhIOF59EMnTd2o45FW/oxMgY9q0y0jGO0HrCLTCZr50e7
-# TZRSNYAy2lyKbvKI2MKlN1wLzJvZbbc//L3s1q3J6KhS0KC2VNEImYdFgVkJej4z
-# ZqHfScTbx9hjFgFpVkJl4xH5VJ8tyJdXE9+vU0k9AaT2QP1Zm3WQmXedSoLjjI7L
-# WznuHwnoGIXLiJMQzPqKqRIFL3wzcrDrZeWgtAdBPbipglZ5CQns6Baj5Mb6a/EZ
-# C9G3faJYK5QVHeE6eLoSEwp1dz5WurLXNPsp0VWplpl/FJb8jrRT/jOoHu85qRcd
-# YpgByU9W7IWPdrthmyfqeAw0omVWN5JxcogYbLo2pANJHlsMdWnxIpN5YwHbGEPC
-# uosBHPk2Xd9+E/pZPQUR6v+D85eEN5A/ZM/xiPpxa8dJZ87BpTvui7/2uflUMJf2
-# Yc9ZLPgEdhQQo0LwMDSTDT48y3sV7Pdo+g5q+MqnJztN/6qt1cgUTe9u+ykCAwEA
-# AaOCAUkwggFFMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSe42+FrpdF2avbUhlk86BLSH5kejAfBgNVHSME
+# Ag8AMIICCgKCAgEApqFIyUkzIyxpL3Q03WmLuy4G9YIUScznhKr+cHOT+/u7Parx
+# I96gxxb1WrWuAxB8qjGLfsbImx8V3ouK1nUcf+R/nsnXas5/iTgV/Tl3QTRGT0De
+# uXBNbpHqc+wC1NiTyA76gLnirvSBEoBzlrpNQFEnuwdbPLCLpTS3KWSCu5J02b+R
+# FWR/kcFzVxnhoE3gIaeURtrGKGBZGKLBXvqggkDENtKkvtvRT32xLvAvL/RpReu5
+# z18ZojCs72ZSoa74Dy8YbaWsDm3OZOpJRZxZsPKCHZ6xNqgFKf0xNHj0t9v0Q3W+
+# 2z5gAVaasJJCvR52Sl0XJ2AOf3l0LSetXgUA5gD5IQ1RvEslTmNnSouTrGID3D1n
+# jY7mBu0puiIdPK2jK/1Weef2+YR4cQpWQkeBZmXidh9AuWdlwxKQL15LJ6K2dw8y
+# /t/PBhmLyt6QAf0CepWRdgZnMytVAUuWHwlZRV9JLY7aX8D55eL9+cOLpX3bGNOm
+# N24UpIW8qtZaqXaesFvIOW23JNLhaaQVvObr1eu7GE/5Mn43e+/DbtdYl/bLP2IQ
+# 1xYEJdSbcUkDFfW3KlZEh+nBKDtaRnNRkbgIgxIbKdT38OKQwZ/aA4uSsiAg6nEP
+# iWBHGuytIo5wU75M5VdjhEqqTHfXYu8BJi6GTzvWT+9ekfMXezqCkksxaG8CAwEA
+# AaOCAUkwggFFMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSAaOo5HWatNzqZn1IF1fcD6nr3ITAfBgNVHSME
 # GDAWgBSfpxVdAF5iXYP05dJlpxtTNRnpcjBfBgNVHR8EWDBWMFSgUqBQhk5odHRw
 # Oi8vd3d3Lm1pY3Jvc29mdC5jb20vcGtpb3BzL2NybC9NaWNyb3NvZnQlMjBUaW1l
 # LVN0YW1wJTIwUENBJTIwMjAxMCgxKS5jcmwwbAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsG
 # AQUFBzAChlBodHRwOi8vd3d3Lm1pY3Jvc29mdC5jb20vcGtpb3BzL2NlcnRzL01p
 # Y3Jvc29mdCUyMFRpbWUtU3RhbXAlMjBQQ0ElMjAyMDEwKDEpLmNydDAMBgNVHRMB
 # Af8EAjAAMBYGA1UdJQEB/wQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMIMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIHgDAN
-# BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAgEAvs4rO3oo8czOrxPqnnSEkUVq718QzlrIiy7/EW7J
-# mQXsJoFxHWUF0Ux0PDyKFDRXPJVv29F7kpJkBJJmcQg5HQV7blUXIMWQ1qX0KdtF
-# QXI/MRL77Z+pK5x1jX+tbRkA7a5Ft7vWuRoAEi02HpFH5m/Akh/dfsbx8wOpecJb
-# YvuHuy4aG0/tGzOWFCxMMNhGAIJ4qdV87JnY/uMBmiodlm+Gz357XWW5tg3HrtNZ
-# XuQ0tWUv26ud4nGKJo/oLZHP75p4Rpt7dMdYKUF9AuVFBwxYZYpvgk12tfK+/yOw
-# q84/fjXVCdM83Qnawtbenbk/lnbc9KsZom+GnvA4itAMUpSXFWrcRkqdUQLN+JrG
-# 6fPBoV8+D8U2Q2F4XkiCR6EU9JzYKwTuvL6t3nFuxnkLdNjbTg2/yv2j3WaDuCK5
-# lSPgsndIiH6Bku2Ui3A0aUo6D9z9v+XEuBs9ioVJaOjf/z+Urqg7ESnxG0/T1dKc
-# i7vLQ2XNgWFYO+/OlDjtGoma1ijX4m14N9qgrXTuWEGwgC7hhBgp3id/LAOf9BST
-# WA5lBrilsEoexXBrOn/1wM3rjG0hIsxvF5/YOK78mVRGY6Y7zYJ+uXt4OTOFBwad
-# Pv8MklreQZLPnQPtiwop4rlLUYaPCiD4YUqRNbLp8Sgyo9g0iAcZYznTuc+8Q8ZI
-# rgwwggdxMIIFWaADAgECAhMzAAAAFcXna54Cm0mZAAAAAAAVMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
+# BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAgEAXxzVZLLXBFfoCCCTiY7MHXdb7civJSTfrHYJC5Ok
+# 2NN75NpzTMT9V2TcIQjfQ3AFUbh1NBAYtMUuwxC6D4ceEXG5lXAnbvkC9YjeLVDR
+# yImXYYmft7z+Qpl9t3C/8a0tiqnOz8Ue8/DYLtMTgvWMnsqLNjILDaImOfnHI36T
+# LCjGFe8RYLXGdCUdOLlfAdMGePxSTA3TAAOc+GQbmPWjrguLWbxvnl3NVjRvrBZV
+# kxFMoVZH0f7qGwDOShjpnv5nYnQ48ufL0uBz52RbPGdX4Fv9+UGOrBprmcHzmIut
+# FtJec2Y4kujNtTK2wBGgWscEOVhFiaVdje8VLJ7MVNKE5TmsuGM3jTLr1nuR5AFG
+# s3UKkP7g3cQD4cHK7XdLiTm7e606QJ+WqeQsADYE9dvU9wIUbI9Dl4UcIErFw+FH
+# aWSTrkfJ4SvLmhKnl5khhpJ1sF3z6e1BxepUliXHqzRLiHWihWIWESF8IHElF3PO
+# xbP4VJqHBiYvaXMV0SyRgwoD6zXddbUnX9WR6JL2BlqAjjHxINwelsp/VhxAWThz
+# uMA58LxvE/VAzjfFF4Wm7a1ZALmJVw3oL/s/uxo1Op4tcT+hfZ9uN1htC1JN4DuR
+# qFfLttjuoAmUQobO5zUFRzvCn8Ck/hiO+bzR15sqkjlxLMyMjpkc/ef4SUUikD46
+# 8vUwggdxMIIFWaADAgECAhMzAAAAFcXna54Cm0mZAAAAAAAVMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
 # CwUAMIGIMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKV2FzaGluZ3RvbjEQMA4GA1UE
 # BxMHUmVkbW9uZDEeMBwGA1UEChMVTWljcm9zb2Z0IENvcnBvcmF0aW9uMTIwMAYD
 # VQQDEylNaWNyb3NvZnQgUm9vdCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBBdXRob3JpdHkgMjAxMDAe
@@ -1659,41 +1659,41 @@ Say "Installation finished"
 # AQEwggEBoYHZpIHWMIHTMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKV2FzaGluZ3Rv
 # bjEQMA4GA1UEBxMHUmVkbW9uZDEeMBwGA1UEChMVTWljcm9zb2Z0IENvcnBvcmF0
 # aW9uMS0wKwYDVQQLEyRNaWNyb3NvZnQgSXJlbGFuZCBPcGVyYXRpb25zIExpbWl0
-# ZWQxJzAlBgNVBAsTHm5TaGllbGQgVFNTIEVTTjoyQTFBLTA1RTAtRDk0NzElMCMG
+# ZWQxJzAlBgNVBAsTHm5TaGllbGQgVFNTIEVTTjo0MDFBLTA1RTAtRDk0NzElMCMG
 # A1UEAxMcTWljcm9zb2Z0IFRpbWUtU3RhbXAgU2VydmljZaIjCgEBMAcGBSsOAwIa
-# AxUAOsyf2b6riPKnnXlIgIL2f53PUsKggYMwgYCkfjB8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzET
+# AxUAMXYp/Wqqdyb0enigrLfxl0InAz6ggYMwgYCkfjB8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzET
 # MBEGA1UECBMKV2FzaGluZ3RvbjEQMA4GA1UEBxMHUmVkbW9uZDEeMBwGA1UEChMV
 # TWljcm9zb2Z0IENvcnBvcmF0aW9uMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1NaWNyb3NvZnQgVGltZS1T
-# dGFtcCBQQ0EgMjAxMDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAIFAO2zHvgwIhgPMjAyNjA1MTYx
-# NjUxMDRaGA8yMDI2MDUxNzE2NTEwNFowdzA9BgorBgEEAYRZCgQBMS8wLTAKAgUA
-# 7bMe+AIBADAKAgEAAgIhcwIB/zAHAgEAAgISqjAKAgUA7bRweAIBADA2BgorBgEE
+# dGFtcCBQQ0EgMjAxMDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAIFAO4FXKYwIhgPMjAyNjA3MTgw
+# MjAwMDZaGA8yMDI2MDcxOTAyMDAwNlowdzA9BgorBgEEAYRZCgQBMS8wLTAKAgUA
+# 7gVcpgIBADAKAgEAAgIYywIB/zAHAgEAAgITSDAKAgUA7gauJgIBADA2BgorBgEE
 # AYRZCgQCMSgwJjAMBgorBgEEAYRZCgMCoAowCAIBAAIDB6EgoQowCAIBAAIDAYag
-# MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBjb6eELCy7c+QKNzPmI4O0riW248wi0uSI0DKx
-# /ZRwZgOShcyQUcjn6Q/SGMTQ9cqeJe/IhyZbzUCTATtImhIybXreibtT2cAMO4M6
-# 3gGHvd96iu8Q49zOYR182At7wmlUTeMrsj51LpZkWCUy4ZSeOSri83Aong5MKGMF
-# Kt2xnKiSYL2tXIm0zcTpX8xjXMMWFb7wa0CBnHn5ZMYJVtuntxE1B4wJyMZktBS6
-# WkP9XpGCXB1X7VhYM3vvtBFq2vA5neloI7waPPPTU+0hK6IX7+c1U776yDnJW4jc
-# OUJsj8rjwrS+Gc/gPt98V3kMoGvxG0eGEzdjkmblUlhT1FwpMYIEDTCCBAkCAQEw
+# MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBq2r0gOT1OxJNWazOFyx2xCpcFbnegtTJkQ4PQ
+# VcbdTaxlE7ksYBeZ0zXLWiv/fSnhonUmp9ORGV6+2phlj6xeV4AyH4dVsmyRBiLN
+# +Fb7Q5qNxhG3ciablIePFBPSFxOxJ33x6wjJF9CLx7iuhmaykYlp5jhWQ3OQerd2
+# FB5vO417JsgGhZscrvZeeamXMWU6LvuPSX02oWth8FbfnIuty1OAtQh9iQwmllq4
+# T+dLJJSkC9Mh0gqKo+v5EBAIQ1fS5TsvfMW73Pt3lydMrZjRhdnTsQ4nge+iE8CN
+# XrKtIO0esovriWQVcDVYcu9DM/2P1UovTKoZ44pcxDz1zk4VMYIEDTCCBAkCAQEw
 # gZMwfDELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCldhc2hpbmd0b24xEDAOBgNVBAcT
 # B1JlZG1vbmQxHjAcBgNVBAoTFU1pY3Jvc29mdCBDb3Jwb3JhdGlvbjEmMCQGA1UE
-# AxMdTWljcm9zb2Z0IFRpbWUtU3RhbXAgUENBIDIwMTACEzMAAAIQq83kFhjvObAA
-# AQAAAhAwDQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBQCgggFKMBoGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzENBgsqhkiG9w0B
-# CRABBDAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgn7/AUpcQFhG3OcHi0Aeq56NC1uclpcmcCkGu
-# +HK5un4wgfoGCyqGSIb3DQEJEAIvMYHqMIHnMIHkMIG9BCDD1SHufsjzY59S1iHU
-# QY9hnsKSrJPg5a9Mc4YnGmPHxjCBmDCBgKR+MHwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYD
+# AxMdTWljcm9zb2Z0IFRpbWUtU3RhbXAgUENBIDIwMTACEzMAAAIZXrLYVHX0sY0A
+# AQAAAhkwDQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBQCgggFKMBoGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzENBgsqhkiG9w0B
+# CRABBDAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQg1hCY9TskS/ocjoNgKVJVguEsAjqzxBlDPM+r
+# Bb91Lt8wgfoGCyqGSIb3DQEJEAIvMYHqMIHnMIHkMIG9BCDckX633E1y1EF32V18
+# zQcrsgjzI9+3Le7mlvk2OebthjCBmDCBgKR+MHwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYD
 # VQQIEwpXYXNoaW5ndG9uMRAwDgYDVQQHEwdSZWRtb25kMR4wHAYDVQQKExVNaWNy
 # b3NvZnQgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xJjAkBgNVBAMTHU1pY3Jvc29mdCBUaW1lLVN0YW1w
-# IFBDQSAyMDEwAhMzAAACEKvN5BYY7zmwAAEAAAIQMCIEIC5b102d224evVIH68x9
-# lEf8Au5vChR0bDNP4SViDwl6MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUABIICAHMgBiQOozDAIR+S
-# O28IjquhCukrxIucbxjLUxu4ltpxavA+cedbwkdNPAMFAYEaLHeEYutciK6N5f4R
-# VIJX/OSx2ZL6ac/xB5A/7rdoaHV7PK+F1y807INXMA2HPnJGDVbi7HD7nJp26Fuz
-# P2K3aGE3kK06C2jXsjdqWsAZv32k1daX+OqFGJdOsmmua/qlF0AMWTXL7rsBStOH
-# 5YI/KXtAsd9vvUbqcCMGeGmnRk6V7NmsKbQIkZ3kDk6YfKoZWmSknCKHF6LzCPkI
-# bZSI8PNhcn19VUl9VS4WXGyWeGG5zBkOXnImAIKlaLMxR8Z9/kQVx84TrsDBl6Yh
-# 34t6ISVDkQtre8SBG6fdjyWKmCOSntciVUlEom8ZwkadixIaf8nOoUJSYq5fl+4J
-# HkcUaY79lJKL5DiENwdC4Lt6eNabRo3SPbQE7IQWbWx5h3et1QDitsZ7Gg9yAHaZ
-# LS/t/SIAy+OXLXNxyttcyrbDvFI8A8tFE9P1w+3MC1n2cveqd6Wu07Z4l74Mj0LX
-# yR+0h/KjfE6SPaL+N20E4CjM0bxRKZ+CuFj/A3tykEADdzFtsEfzUzTDkD3cJpOj
-# fojWQNX1ly8Tu3G/WdAFqzrln2y8jCbVdPIqo1ntbu+BbYom1VQqAihYQB855+pG
-# D8bOWbnrvhUua7gDFFDA762iZMxD
+# IFBDQSAyMDEwAhMzAAACGV6y2FR19LGNAAEAAAIZMCIEIDjz74g3CBfNc6GVJRjf
+# Y0YVIg76oCasifagFFulpBDbMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUABIICADak0YxE5whyHvYr
+# Zukn9brxBTp9erdA6poINujmoiK5ZrTv6SZYaJbSI0HnDxbxp9QchY3BwpI19ix5
+# +excveLH8i0oQWql3XyZcBDcwBi9sfFDv+yuJfd1CE27X8YxGy5OJeKCK9QoQiXs
+# b0MgT35WaxPxvRwcUArXf8qwkP+CO4EkL9x+ZCznyvutSebHKS5fRRPgVreJKRg2
+# vNh4J2lujjEIsOduZs8o5U7woRCBgN/v6lDl9x35WHgoHSzxSwQz7HZea/gcbXa6
+# GRezjA7bCzS1H99feDX3KiTi1kIxtKilQOVzOO9XqrTYoZGak7NeNW12IqbmeYHF
+# ZVW8XkBg5U8BdPpS/3/wD7Y8K1429YSIrJLdccR16TCwlItiqbnFrPt1+qPUH64K
+# okrklXX5tYZMe9cXKCC6GlP8oSw1mBf3i85h7YkQf7MgLMbhuBKPBndY7PYfeXNY
+# zjiH4lwKswYlJHqagmw2xYvT00Ekchjo9k6HGaUK1gzCK/ISGOiNb1pr6xf5hK6K
+# TL9zvNOvRxOr6L/fBLjzRFCy4TiBmOAn6uq50hl/7H7hwuoxIXVHcPqZbgRfng7z
+# PXEyYpUtVfNMlrFfD0u6mXTp9Ez+1W0hs55SVN4CuwKAO9g1nVBc5i+7KwEpYVfU
+# kJuzixuLkM8/Hhm7X6wRAwAqpA7P
 # SIG # End signature block
diff --git a/package-lock.json b/package-lock.json
index 5e5a13d..7bae4b0 100644
--- a/package-lock.json
+++ b/package-lock.json
@@ -1634,9 +1634,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@nodable/entities": {
-      "version": "2.2.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@nodable/entities/-/entities-2.2.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-9uGyhaQavEUMC8AIddIjau4NsnsXhou+j5sBAGojCM1oxmQpVKTWR/9JxABD6UAv12vpIms55fPZKFQEhG6uBg==",
+      "version": "3.0.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@nodable/entities/-/entities-3.0.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-8L9xFeTYKhm49xfIypoe2W5wV1m/3Z58kT+7kR9A8OyFxcPduI4VmxaUMQyKYrRjUoLLSXv6EKKID5Tvj9cUVw==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "github",
@@ -2367,9 +2367,6 @@
         "arm64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "glibc"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2384,9 +2381,6 @@
         "arm64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "musl"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2401,9 +2395,6 @@
         "loong64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "glibc"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2418,9 +2409,6 @@
         "loong64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "musl"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2435,9 +2423,6 @@
         "ppc64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "glibc"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2452,9 +2437,6 @@
         "riscv64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "glibc"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2469,9 +2451,6 @@
         "riscv64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "musl"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2486,9 +2465,6 @@
         "s390x"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "glibc"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2503,9 +2479,6 @@
         "x64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "glibc"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2520,9 +2493,6 @@
         "x64"
       ],
       "dev": true,
-      "libc": [
-        "musl"
-      ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,
       "os": [
@@ -2870,15 +2840,15 @@
       "license": "Apache-2.0"
     },
     "node_modules/brace-expansion": {
-      "version": "5.0.6",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.6.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-kLpxurY4Z4r9sgMsyG0Z9uzsBlgiU/EFKhj/h91/8yHu0edo7XuixOIH3VcJ8kkxs6/jPzoI6U9Vj3WqbMQ94g==",
+      "version": "5.0.9",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-5.0.9.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ScQ4IuvIEF1TMlP7Zt+vjJ//9zlPb2SDcxWxM3bk8s6t6GGdJ7KO1dCcTidOPJKePW30LE/2cT7wCyPho9/Wxg==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "balanced-match": "^4.0.2"
       },
       "engines": {
-        "node": "18 || 20 || >=22"
+        "node": "20 || >=22"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/browserslist": {
@@ -3764,9 +3734,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/fast-xml-parser": {
-      "version": "5.9.3",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-xml-parser/-/fast-xml-parser-5.9.3.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-brCNCeScma/kqa54J4PIDriSSSLssRkuYaUCpvHJulGc3HGI/xxKUCTDcYkAdqJsyb//ydpbxecjC3hB9+tb/g==",
+      "version": "5.10.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fast-xml-parser/-/fast-xml-parser-5.10.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-IEMIf7298kXuZSRFoGfMYrl7is8LpavODgbNz1cwIudv7KwVFnuU+UsMporfq6PD6aXSlawZlARiA3UywCTfMw==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "github",
@@ -3775,17 +3745,32 @@
       ],
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@nodable/entities": "^2.2.0",
+        "@nodable/entities": "^3.0.0",
         "fast-xml-builder": "^1.2.0",
-        "is-unsafe": "^1.0.1",
-        "path-expression-matcher": "^1.5.0",
+        "is-unsafe": "^2.0.0",
+        "path-expression-matcher": "^1.6.2",
         "strnum": "^2.4.1",
-        "xml-naming": "^0.1.0"
+        "xml-naming": "^0.3.0"
       },
       "bin": {
         "fxparser": "src/cli/cli.js"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/fast-xml-parser/node_modules/xml-naming": {
+      "version": "0.3.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/xml-naming/-/xml-naming-0.3.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ghig2TBE/H11aOVgmahA3MhimvkBr6JIYknH/Dhdk10nXwdbIqBJsbfMxpvFPG8bAw77gN29aQWvKpmVoPlvPQ==",
+      "funding": [
+        {
+          "type": "github",
+          "url": "https://github.com/sponsors/NaturalIntelligence"
+        }
+      ],
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.0.0"
+      }
+    },
     "node_modules/fb-watchman": {
       "version": "2.0.2",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fb-watchman/-/fb-watchman-2.0.2.tgz",
@@ -3993,9 +3978,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/glob/node_modules/brace-expansion": {
-      "version": "2.1.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-2.1.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-WR1cURNjuvBLMZBMbqM0UoE+WAfdUcEV1ccD8PVBVOI+Z3ND4+SZbN8RsfT2bMuG1qwz5RFvPukSZm5fF2D5eA==",
+      "version": "2.1.4",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-2.1.4.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-hGfVzPxthbf3+2yjg/RBs60cB0FhqBS/zvdV/4wn4/BmN0bNMMHPc4V/BbFieqf1TKAGGAHnY4eSjajCl0f2Xg==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
@@ -4254,9 +4239,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/is-unsafe": {
-      "version": "1.0.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/is-unsafe/-/is-unsafe-1.0.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-CLK2+VdgERgD96EYm5lUQssZYlRg2tkZnbsxZoacmSiRxiFJ4Nk4SzjCl+Ur+v3kXIY9dTIdb3IH22y1mZ56LA==",
+      "version": "2.0.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/is-unsafe/-/is-unsafe-2.0.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-2LdV822R+wmI86unXA93WCFpL6g+av8ynWk0nrHyJqGop5VoocYsSLFgN8jrfalT6iGeLNM4KXuVSsULP53kEA==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "github",
@@ -5191,9 +5176,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/minimatch/node_modules/brace-expansion": {
-      "version": "1.1.15",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-1.1.15.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-EwOCDEex4quD37XhqM3omwtMoJjr//isUZz1JopUNWms+4Z2ViyM/k1YIRePpoVNnQhENnxtFjLaxNHrT7xIUg==",
+      "version": "1.1.18",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/brace-expansion/-/brace-expansion-1.1.18.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Edep/X9fGqVNmzKBVsDYIOtD+z1tuezV70LBjdCst9Tqu76lsnvRiZ6oTic1n+/BIwX6QDGAO94PN4N2SADvtw==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "balanced-match": "^1.0.0",
@@ -5407,9 +5392,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/path-expression-matcher": {
-      "version": "1.5.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/path-expression-matcher/-/path-expression-matcher-1.5.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-cbrerZV+6rvdQrrD+iGMcZFEiiSrbv9Tfdkvnusy6y0x0GKBXREFg/Y65GhIfm0tnLntThhzCnfKwp1WRjeCyQ==",
+      "version": "1.6.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/path-expression-matcher/-/path-expression-matcher-1.6.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-enSlaiat05iasnzmgNxRj8reFdj3puY2QpNgP1aPIaVfT6nn9ICuPoFlKHk8EN22HcwewshO+mN2DGbkCEOtqQ==",
       "funding": [
         {
           "type": "github",
@@ -6281,9 +6266,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/undici": {
-      "version": "6.27.0",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici/-/undici-6.27.0.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-YmfV3YnEDzXRC5lZ2jWtWWHKGUm1zIt8AhesR1tens+HTNv+YZlN/dp6G727LOvMJ8xjP9Be7Y2Sdr96LDm+pg==",
+      "version": "6.28.0",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/undici/-/undici-6.28.0.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-LIY910g9TI13YS95lrMFrs8Rm/u/irgHeTWoKCoteeJ04CUJ92eEfj0rVn+7VKMPBpUPiUoBKfhNyLI23EE/KA==",
       "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=18.17"